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A bstract
Chaos, with reference to chaos theory, refers to an apparent lack of order in a system 
that, nevertheless, obeys particular laws or rules. The chaotic signals generated by 
chaotic systems have some properties such as randomness, complexity and sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions, which make them particularly suitable for secure 
communications. Since the 1990s, the problem of secure communication, based on 
chaos synchronization, has been thoroughly investigated and many methods, for in­
stance, robust and adaptive control approaches, have been proposed to realize the 
chaos synchronization. However, from systems theory perspective, it may seem obvi­
ous that many robust and adaptive control methods could be considered for possible 
attacks against secure communication.
In this thesis, we introduce the concept of secure chaos synchronization from the con­
trol theoretic view point. A new secure communication system, based on the chaos 
synchronization, is proposed and its security is analyzed, both theoretically and nu­
merically.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Acknowledgem ents
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my advisor, Dr. Abdelhamid Tayebi, 
for his guidance and support during the years of my graduate studies. He has been 
of inestimable help in formulating my understanding of control theory.
I also want to thank all the professors and graduate students of the faculty of Engi­
neering of Lakehed University for their kind help to my thesis.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and my wife Zhuoli for their endless love and 
support.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 M otivation.......................................................................................................  2
1.2 Thesis Objective ........................................................................................  7
1.3 Thesis S tructure...........................................................................................  8
2 Chaos and Chaotic System s 10
2.1 Examples of Chaos Phenomenon................................................................  11
2.1.1 The Logistic M a p ......................................................................................
2.1.2 The Lorenz E q u a tio n s .....................................................................  14
2.2 C h a o s ..............................................................................................................  17
2.2.1 What Is C haos? ................................................................................... 17
2.2.2 Classification of C h a o s ......................................................................  17
2.2.3 Characteristics of Chaotic S y s te m s ...............................................  20
2.2.4 Lyapunov E x p o n en ts .........................................................................  22
2.3 Generalized Lorenz S ystem ........................................................................... 24
3 Chaos and Cryptography 27
3.1 Basic Principles of Cryptography  ................................................. 28
3.2 Conventional and Chaotic C ry p to g rap h y ................................................. 29
3.3 Chaotic C ryptosystem s.................................................................................  31
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3.3.1 Chaos-Based Cipher ........................................................................  32
3.3.2 Chaotic Secure Communications..................................................... 33
4 Chaos Synchronization 37
4.1 Synchronization of Chaotic S ystem s..........................................................  38
4.1.1 Pecora-Carroll’s A p p ro ach ............................................................... 39
4.1.2 Observer-based Synchronization.....................................................  43
4.2 Application in Secure Com m unications....................................................  51
4.2.1 Chaotic M a sk in g ...............................................................................  52
4.2.2 Chaotic Modulation ........................................................................  54
4.2.3 Chaotic Switching...............................................................................  56
5 N ew  Secure Com m unication System  59
5.1 Secure Synchronization..................................................................................  60
5.1.1 Example of Insecure Synchronization...........................................  61
5.1.2 Concept of Secure S ynchronization ............................................... 64
5.1.3 Secure Synchronization S c h e m e .....................................................  69
5.2 A New Secure Communication S y s te m ..................................................  78
5.2.1 System S tru c tu re ...............................................................................  79
5.2.2 Simulation R e s u l t s ............................................................................  84
5.2.3 System Security A nalysis..................................................................  89
5.3 Secure Communication System with the Time-Delay............................... 92
5.3.1 Simulation R e s u l t s ............................................................................  96
6 Conclusion 102
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
List of Figures
2.1 Logistic map with different p a ra m e te rs ..................................................... 13
2.2 Behavior of the Lorenz system with different value of parameters . . .  16
2.3 The chaotic behaviour of the Chua’s system and the Rossler system . 19
2.4 Two trajectories started with the initial state Xo = 1
(the broken line) and x'0 = 1.001 (the solid l i n e ) ....................................  21
2.5 Trajectories starting from two nearby p o in t s ...........................................  23
2.6 The chaotic behaviour of the Chen system and the Lii system . . . .  25
3.1 The general cryptosystem ............................................................................ 29
3.2 Different classes of encryption systems .....................................................  31
3.3 Schematic diagram of the chaos-based c ip h e r ...........................................  32
3.4 Example of encrypting and decrypting an image
file with a chaos-based cipher ....................................................................  34
3.5 The chaotic secure communication s y s t e m ............................................... 36
4.1 Results of chaos synchronization from P-C approach....................  42
4.2 The components of the synchronization error for
the drive system (4.5) and the full-dimensional response system (4.9) 44
4.3 The components of the synchronization error for system (4.22) and (4.23) 47
4.4 Synchronization errors of systems (4.14) and (4.17) for 6 = 3 .... 51
4.5 Synchronization errors of systems (4.14) and (4.17) for 0 =  10 . . . .  51
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4.6 Chaotic signal masking cryp tosystem .......................................................  52
4.7 Sound signal encryption and recovery with chaotic masking method:
(a) original sound signal; (b) recovered sound signal; (c) transmission 
signal.................................................................................................................  54
4.8 Chaotic signal modulation c ry p to sy s te m ................................................ 55
4.9 Transmission of message signals with the chaotic modulation method:
(a) original message signal; (b) recovered message signal; (c) transmis­
sion s ig n a l........................................................................................................  56
4.10 Chaotic signal switching s y s te m ................................................................  57
4.11 Discrete signal encryption and recovery with chaotic switching method:
(a) digital information signal; (b)synchronization error power; (c) low 
pass filtered signal; (d) recovered digital signal.........................................  58
5.1 Adaptive-observer-based synchronization................................................  65
5.2 The unknown parameters and the estimated param eters......................  65
5.3 Chaotic behaviour of the drive system (5 .2 6 ) .......................................... 74
5.4 Synchronization of the drive system and the observer-based
response sy s te m ..............................................................................................  75
5.5 “Fake” synchronization of the system (5.26) and (5.27)
with unmatched key parameter k ..............................................................  78
5.6 Block diagram of the chaotic secure communication s y s te m ................ 79
5.7 Chaotic behaviour of system (5.54)................   80
5.8 Nonlinear function used in continuous shift c ip h e r ................................  81
5.9 The transm ission s ig n a l ................................................................................. 85
5.10 Synchronization e r r o r s .................................................................................  85
5.11 The original information signal and the recovered s ig n al......................  86
5.12 The behaviour of nondecaying errors of the “fake” synchronization
with Kd =  0 and nr =  0.001............................................................................  87
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5.13 The original message signal and the wrongly recovered signal
with the unmatched K e y ..............................................................................  87
5.14 Simulation results for transmitting the sound signal with the
same “Key” in transmitter and receiver s y s te m s ....................................  88
5.15 Simulation results for transmitting the sound signal with the 
unmatched “Key” in transmitter and receiver system s..........................  89
5.16 The dependence of the recovered signal power on a fixed error in pa­
rameters k , Ai_3, re sp ec tiv e ly ....................................................................  91
5.17 Synchronization errors of the secure communication system
with the time-delay.........................................................................................  97
5.18 The original message signal and the recovered signal.............................  98
5.19 The behaviour of nondecaying errors of the “fake” synchronization
with Kd — 0 and nr — 0.001............................................................................ 99
5.20 The original message signal and the wrongly recovered signal
with the unmatched key p a ra m e te r ........................................................... 99
5.21 Simulation results for transmitting the sound signal with the
same “Key” in transm itter and receiver s y s te m s ....................................  100
5.22 Simulation results for transmitting the sound signal with the 
unmatched “Key” in transmitter and receiver system s..........................  101
v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
List of Tables
5.1 Brute-force key search times for various key sizes
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Nonlinear systems, which have attracted heightened interest and refreshed vigor 
since the last decades, have always played a crucial role in the study of natural phe­
nomena. The interest in nonlinear system research is mainly boosted by the discovery 
of chaos. One of the basic principles of science, concerning deterministic systems, is 
that the behaviour of these systems can be predicted. The discovery of chaos phe­
nomena, however, has proven that this point of view may not be true all the time.
Chaos, with reference to chaos theory, is a relatively new discipline, with bound­
less applications in all areas of science and technology such as: mathematics, physics, 
biology, chemistry as well as engineering. Chaos describes a specific range of irreg­
ular behaviour of what we consider to be simple, well-behaved systems. The type 
of behaviour, that in the last few decades has come to be called “chaotic” (Li and 
Yorke 1975), looks erratic and almost random, which is quite similar to the behaviour 
of a system strongly influenced by the outside, random noise. Nevertheless, chaotic 
systems, defined as dynamical systems having such random-like behaviour, are some­
times very simple systems, almost free of noise. In fact, these systems are essentially 
deterministic; that is, given the initial condition and the equations describing a sys­
tem, the future behaviour of the system can be predicted for all t ime.
One of the most essential elements in chaotic dynamical systems is the unpre­
dictability, which is caused by the extreme sensitivity to initial conditions and control
1
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parameters, otherwise known to the world as the “butterfly-effect” (Lorenz 1963). 
This concept means that with a nonlinear chaotic system, even infinitesimal changes 
in initial conditions or control parameters will result in dramatically different output 
of that system. This makes the evolution of the nonlinear chaotic system become 
entirely “unpredictable” as time elapses (Lorenz 1963; Lorenz 1993).
Another salient feature about chaotic systems is their ability to synchronize with 
each other under some certain conditions. Since the long-term behaviour of chaotic 
dynamical systems is impossible to predict, such a synchronization seems impossible. 
However, it has been proved that under certain circumstances two or more chaotic 
dynamical systems, which are coupled together and evolving from different initial 
conditions, can undergo identical motion (Pecora and Carroll 1990; Pecora and Car­
roll 1991).
1.1 M otivation
Currently, along with the rapid advancement of information technology, comput­
ers have become major components of information technology for a variety of applica­
tions, such as communications, electronic mail, on-line business and others. Moreover, 
the Internet and communication systems have become another important component 
of information technology to provide connectivity at global and local scales, for the 
sharing of various information and data. This leads to an explosive increase in trans­
mission of messages containing the useful information through different ways. It is 
no surprise then, in such transmission, implementing and maintaining security and 
privacy is a prerequisite to protect the information as well as the systems involved in 
the transmission. Cryptography becomes necessary when higher security and privacy 
are specially required, especially when the message is transmitted over any untrusted 
medium, which includes any network, particularly, the Internet. The main objective of 
cryptography is to develop a cryptosystem, which keeps the transmission information
2
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secret and tamper-proof; protects information from unauthorized parties; prevents 
fraud; and ensures personal privacy. Therefore, in light of their important role, cryp­
tosystems have become an indispensable part of modern information technology.
Chaotic systems have several interesting features such as the ergodicity, ran­
domness, nonperiodicity and sensitive dependence on initial conditions (Lasota and 
Mackey 1997; Hilborn 1994), which make them very attractive to the cryptographist. 
In fact, some researchers have pointed out that such significant properties can be 
connected with several cryptographic primitive characters such as “diffusion” and 
“confusion” required by modern cryptography (Fridrich 1998; Kocarev et al. 1998; 
Alvarez et al. 1999). Interestingly, the idea of using chaos in cryptography is not novel 
and can be traced back to Shannon’s classic paper titled “Communication Theory of 
Secrecy Systems” published in 1949 (Shannon 1949). Of course, he could not use the 
term chaos; he just mentioned that the good mixing transformations, used in a good 
secrecy system, depend on their arguments in a “sensitive” way. The good mixing 
transformations can be considered as chaotic maps or equations bounded in limited 
phase space with positive Lyapunov exponents. In fact, from an algorithmic point of 
view, any good cryptosystem can be regarded as a chaotic or pseudo-chaotic system 
(Chirkikov and Vivaldi 1999), since perfect cryptographic properties are ensured by 
pseudo-random disorder, generated from deterministic encryption operations, which 
is just like chaos generated from chaotic dynamical systems (Brown and Chua 1996). 
In (Gotz et al. 1997 ), it has been shown that some conventional cryptosystems can 
present chaotic behaviour. This definitely reveals that there exists a tight relation­
ship between chaos and cryptography, so it is a natural idea to use chaos and chaotic 
systems to enrich the design of new chaos-based cryptosystems.
In the last few decades, the construction of chaos-based cryptosystems has a t­
tracted a great deal of attention, and plenty of chaotic cryptosystems have been 
developed, among which two main design paradigms for two different purposes can 
be found in the literature: the discrete-time chaotic cryptosystem and the continuous­
time chaotic cryptosystem.
3
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Discrete-time chaotic cryptosystems, as the name suggest, is used to encrypt the 
digital information by employing discrete-time chaotic dynamical systems. In this 
application, discrete-time chaotic systems are usually used as the pseudo-random bit 
generators, which serve as a one-time pad for encrypting the information. The use of 
discrete-time chaotic systems for the encryption purpose has been done for the first 
time by Matthews (Matthews 1989). In his approach, a one-dimensional chaotic map, 
exhibiting chaotic behaviour for a range of initial conditions and control parameters, 
has been utilized to generate a sequence of pseudo-random numbers in order to en­
crypt and decrypt the message. Shortly thereafter, in 1990, a cryptosystem based 
on a piecewise linear chaotic Tent map was developed by Habutsu with his colleague 
(Habutsu et a l 1991), where the parameter of the Tent map was used as a secret 
key, and the encryption and decryption were achieved by performing the inverse and 
forward iterations of the chaotic Tent map, respectively. A great number of other dis­
crete chaotic cryptographic algorithms have also been proposed in the recent years; 
see (Li et al. 2001), and (Masuda and Aihara 2002), for a more comprehensive de­
scription of the discrete-time chaotic cryptosystems.
Continuous-time chaotic cryptosystems, on the other hand, aim mainly to use 
continuous-time chaotic dynamical systems to generate the broadband, nonperiodic 
and noise-like chaotic signals for secure communications, where message signals, usu­
ally continuous signals, are hidden into the chaotic signal at the transm itter side, and 
recovered at the receiver side through the chaos synchronization technique.
The idea of utilizing synchronous chaotic systems for secure communications was 
first discovered by Pecora and Carroll (Pecora and Carroll 1990). They reported 
that certain chaotic systems can be decomposed into two subsystems: a drive subsys­
tem and a stable response subsystem that synchronize when they are coupled with a 
common drive signal. After that, vast amounts of research of chaos synchronization 
and its application to secure communications have been presented in the literature. 
Adhering to the Pecora-Carroll drive-response concept, several chaotic secure com­
munication systems have been successfully established (Chua et al. 1992; Oppenheim
4
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et al. 1992; Ogorzalek 1993; Halle et al. 1993). Furthermore, based on Lyapunov 
stability criterion, linear or nonlinear state feedback is another useful way to achieve 
synchronization of two isolated chaotic systems for secure communication applica­
tions (Wu and Chua 1994). More recently, some traditional problems in systems and 
control theory have been linked to chaos synchronization (Morgiil and Solak 1996; 
Nijmeijer and Mareels 1997; Morgiil 1999). This treatment opens another world of 
the synchronization problem for chaotic secure communication purpose. For example, 
a nonlinear state observer design approach is developed to solve the chaotic synchro­
nization problem of a class of chaotic systems in (Grassi and Mascolo 1997; Liao and 
Huang 1999; Alvarez-Ramirez et al. 2002). Moreover, in (Liao and Lin, 1999; Frad­
kov et al. 1999; Lian et al. 2002), the adaptive observer design method is presented 
to design the receiver system for a secure communication system to deal with the 
problem of synchronizing two chaotic systems with mismatching parameters, since 
the adaptive mechanism can compensate for the effects of those parametric uncer­
tainties.
Following these approaches, the proposed chaotic secure communication methods 
may be classified as: chaotic masking, chaotic modulation and chaotic switching. In 
the first case, the private message signal is just added to the chaotic carrier signal 
(Pecora and Carroll 1991; Cuomo and Oppenheim 1993; Lian et al. 2002). In the 
second case, not only is the message signal added to the chaotic carrier signal, but 
also the states of the chaotic generator are modulated by the message signal through 
an invertible procedure; thus, the generated chaotic signal inherently contains the 
information of the message signal (Halle et al. 1993; Liao and Huang 1999; Boutayeb 
et al 2002). In the third case, chaotic switching is based on the requirement of two 
distinct chaotic systems for bits “1” and “0” . The transmission signal is obtained 
by switching between these two chaotic systems according to either a bit “1” or “0” 
of the message signal being transm itted (Cuomo and Oppenheim 1993; Kolumban 
et al 1997; Murali et a l 2001). Clearly, the two former approaches are designed 
for transmitting analog signals, while the latter is designed for transmitting digital
5
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signals.
Although being demonstrated successfully in computer simulations and hardware 
implementation, the preliminary application of chaotic systems for the secure com­
munications has a low level of security because an intruder can extract the hidden 
message signal from the transmission signal by using different unmasking techniques 
(Short 1996). To overcome the problem of unmasking the message signal from the 
chaotic transmission signal, several different approaches have been recently intro­
duced to improve the security of the chaotic cryptosystem. For instance, a more 
advanced encryption scheme of using multiple chaotic signals is developed in (Yang 
et al. 1997), and in (Grassi and Mascolo 1999; Murali et al. 2001), the authors pre­
sented an idea of achieving secure transmission of the message signal by considering 
the fact that encrypting the chaotic signal is as important as encrypting the message 
signal. Therefore, for this purpose, the conventional cryptographic method and chaos 
synchronization are combined together for the design of a chaotic cryptosystem, which 
can offer higher security and privacy for the users.
Nevertheless, since all these chaotic secure communication systems, mentioned 
above, are based on the synchronization properties of simple chaotic systems, the 
key issue for these approaches is the security of the synchronization. This means the 
synchronization of chaotic systems should play a crucial role in preventing the private 
message from being read by any intruder during the transmission procedure. Unfor­
tunately this problem did not get the deserved consideration when synchronization- 
based secure communication schemes were proposed in the past. For example, in 
(Suykens et al. 1999; Li and Shi 2003), some researchers have proposed the robust 
synchronization and adaptive synchronization theory to deal with the parameter mis­
match or unknown parameter problems. As we know, the value of parameters of 
the chaotic system is usually considered as the secret “Key” for the synchronization 
between the transm itter and the receiver. These robust and adaptive approaches, 
however, give a possibility to measure the “Key” . This means that by using the 
robust and adaptive techniques, an intruder can design a receiver system, which can
6
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synchronize with the transmitter system without the precise knowledge of the “key” . 
Therefore, from the viewpoint of systems theory, many adaptive or robust control 
methods may be considered for possible attacks against secure communications and 
encryption schemes. In light of this, the concept of secure synchronization with re­
spect to adaptive and robust control methods has been introduced in (Celikovsky and 
Chen 2005).
1.2 Thesis Objective
Inspired by the earlier works of other researchers, in this thesis, we further study 
the behaviour of chaotic dynamical systems and its application in modern cryptogra­
phy. The primary objective of this thesis is to develop a chaotic secure communication 
scheme based on the synchronization of two continuous-time chaotic dynamical sys­
tems, which can provide higher security level for the transmission of various kind of 
messages. Moreover, since the signal propagation delay is unavoidable for any real 
communication system, the second objective is to verify the validity of the developed 
communication system with an unknown propagation time-delay involved during the 
transmission of message signals. In order to fulfill these objectives, we first analyze the 
security of several synchronization approaches for certain chaotic systems proposed 
in the literature, from the control theory viewpoint, since chaos synchronization is 
the basis of the design of secure communication systems. As we know, due to the fact 
that chaotic systems are very sensitive to initial conditions and control parameters, a 
very general way used in almost all the chaotic secure communication schemes is to 
set the values of system parameters as the secret “Key”, which means that only the 
transm itter and the receiver in a communication system using the exact same “Key” 
can realize the synchronization. Some synchronization methods,, however, have been 
proposed without this consideration, implying that even with a different “Key” the 
synchronization can still be achieved. This means that the security requirement for
7
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these synchronization methods is not satisfied.
Since the security property is the most important aspect of chaos synchronization, 
the concept of secure synchronization of synchronized chaotic systems, from the con­
trol theory point of view, is then presented in detail in order to lay a sound foundation 
for the later development of the secure communication scheme. Also, based on the 
generalized Lorenz system, a new chaotic secure communication scheme, which com­
bines the secure synchronization scheme with the conventional cryptographic tech­
nique, is developed in this thesis. The analysis of its security is performed from 
both the control theory viewpoint and the cryptographical viewpoint to verify that 
the proposed secure communication system can offer a higher security and privacy 
for the transmission of messages. Finally, the stability of the proposed secure com­
munication system with the time-delay problem is discussed, since the propagation 
time-delay during the transmission procedure is always exist for any real communi­
cation systems.
1.3 Thesis Structure
This research was multidisciplinary and involved several different fields of re­
search: nonlinear dynamics, chaos theory, communications, cryptography and control 
theory. The first portion of this dissertation provides a comprehensive overview of 
those fields of research. The second portion provides a detailed description of our 
research contribution: Designing a new secure communication system based on the 
secure synchronization scheme.
In Chapter 2, we present a comprehensive overview of chaos and chaotic systems 
by describing the definition, classification and characteristics of chaos and chaotic 
systems. Particularly, a class of chaotic systems named generalized Lorenz system is 
also introduced in this chapter.
Chapter 3 focuses on representing the relationship between chaotic systems with
8
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the modern cryptography. Some basic principles of cryptography are introduced, and 
two different kinds of chaotic cryptosystems are presented.
Chapter 4 is devoted to introducing the methodology of chaos synchronization. 
There are two major schemes for coupling and synchronizing identical chaotic systems 
that are investigated in detail, especially the one approached from the control theory 
point of view, namely, the observer-based synchronization. Further, the application 
of chaos synchronization for secure communication is discussed, and some examples 
are provided.
In Chapter 5, attention is turned to designing a new secure communication system 
on the basis of secure synchronization of chaotic systems. First, a scheme of chaotic 
secure synchronization using the generalized Lorenz system family as the platform is 
presented. Then, a new secure communication system is developed and its security is 
discussed. Furthermore, the validity of the secure communication system is analyzed 
by taking into account the propagation time-delay problem.
Finally, conclusions are summarized in Chapter 6, where the future work is also 
mentioned.
9
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Chapter 2
Chaos and Chaotic System s
As one of the greatest accomplishment in human's >ry, the differ j : ' 1 cal­
culus and the laws of motion discovered by Newton, in me 17th century, ga- 
the deterministic view of nature and then led to a great optimism about our ability 
to predict the behaviour of dynamical systems. Subsequent generations of scientists 
believed that the nature of dynamical systems was expected to be completely deter­
mined dependent upon the nature of the forces acting on them and upon their initial 
states.
According to the Newtonian laws of physics, it was assumed that, if the initial 
condition for any dynamical system could be measured precisely, the behaviour of 
the dynamical system could be predicted accurately, and that the more accurate the 
measurements of initial conditions were, the more precise would be the resulting pre­
dictions. However, in the early 20th century, Poincare, a great French mathematician, 
discovered that in some astronomical systems, there were an unpredictability for the 
system evolution, which meant that even a small error in the measurement of initial 
conditions would make the prediction about the system future condition impossible. 
In fact, this unpredictability is so called “chaos” now. Even though Poincare could 
not use the unburned term “chaos” to describe the unpredictability at that time, he 
did prove mathematically that, even if the measurement could be made much more 
precise, the unpredictability for outcomes did not shrink along with the inaccuracy
10
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of measurement, but remained huge (Poincare 1892-1899).
Half a century later, Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist at MIT, worked on a project 
to simulate weather patterns on a computer. He accidentally found the surprising 
phenomenon that, with some certain parameters, the deterministic system described 
by ordinary differential equations that he used to theoretically model the motion of 
atmospheric air flow became unpredictable (Lorenz 1963). This has become known 
as the phenomenon of chaos. After repeated experimentation, Lorenz revealed the 
underlying mechanism of chaos: simply formulated systems with only a few variables 
can display highly complicated behaviour that is unpredictable. This started a new
age for humanity’s understanding of nature and triggered enthusiasm in the study of
chaos phenomenon.
2.1 Examples of Chaos Phenom enon
Humanity’s understanding for the natural and social phenomenon originally 
stems from some particular things or events, and the discovery of chaos is no ex­
ception. In this section, we shall briefly introduce the chaos phenomenon through 
two representative examples of chaotic systems.
2.1.1 The Logistic Map
The first example of chaotic systems is a very simple m?«’hematical model from 
ecology named the logistic map, also called the logistic eqv -i, which is often used 
to describe the growth of biological population. Due to its mathematical simplicity, 
the simple model continues to be a useful tool for new ideas in chaos study.
The equation of logistic map is given by:
xn+i = /jLXn{l -  xn) =  f{ x n), n =  1,2,.... (2.1)
11
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where, p  is a constant depending on the conditions of the ecological environment, and 
xn represents the population of a species reproducing in a controlled environment at 
generation n. To keep the number manageable, we let xn represent the percentage 
of some a priori upper bound for the population, so 0 < x n < 1 (Kapitaniak 2000). 
Given this equation with some initial population x0, it would seem straightforward 
to predict the behaviour of xn. As we shall see, however, this is far from the case 
for certain values of the constant p. For different values of the parameter p, the 
dynamical analysis of the model of the logistic equation can be carried out as follows:
1.) For 0 < p  < 1, the dynamical characteristics of the logistic equation is very 
simple, and x  =  0 is the only equilibrium or fixed point in the range of x, which 
means that the population of the species decreases and dies.
2.) For 1 < p < 3, there are two equilibrium points for the dynamical system of the 
logistic equation that are x  =  0 and x  =  1 — and the equilibrium point of 
x — 0 becomes a “repelling fixed point” since trajectories that start near x  =  0 
move away from that value. This implies that the population increases for a 
few generations, then becomes stable, as Figure 2.1(a) shows.
3.) For 3 < p  < 4, the logistic equation presents a complex dynamical behaviour 
that the values of x  oscillate back and forth between two values, and then four, 
then eight, then sixteen, etc, as shown in Figure 2.1(b,c). Finally, it turns into 
never settling down to a periodic cycle — instead the long term behaviour is 
aperiodic, that is chaos, as shown in Figure 2.1(d).
It is noticeable that the system has a periodic behaviour with p  =  3.3, shown 
in Figure 2.1(b), and then as the value of the parameter p  changes to p = 3.53, this 
periodicity becomes twice that of the behaviour with p — 3.3, as shown in Figure 
2.1(c). This phenomenon refers to the period-doubling bifurcation, which is one of the 
most primary routers to chaos (Reichl 1992).
12
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i ST
(a) /i =  2.8 (b) n  =  3.3
I
(c) n  =  3.53 (d) jj, — 4.0
Figure 2.1: Logistic map with different parameters
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2.1.2 The Lorenz Equations
Our second example of chaotic systems is the highly simplified model of a convect- 
ing fluid, originally introduced by E. Lorenz in 1963 (Lorenz 1963). In this paradigmic 
model, what Lorenz set out to demonstrate was that even a very simple system may 
have an unusual and unpredictable behaviour. The Lorenz system can be expressed 
by the following three coupled differential equations:
f t  =  - * ( X - V )
' f  = ~ x z + P x ~ y  (2-2)
, f t  =  xy ~ 0 z
where state variables x ,y ,z  are related to the physical properties of a convecting 
fluid, and a  is called the Prandtl number, which is usually set as a value of 10. The
parameter (3 relates to the size of the area represented by this convecting fluid model
O
and it was set to (3 =  g. Finally, p, called the Rayleigh number, is the adjustable 
control parameter.
This model, also called the Lorenz system, although based on what appears to 
be a very simple set of differential equations, exhibits very complex behaviour with 
certain parameters. In the following part we shall explain why this simple dynamical 
system may present an unusual chaotic behavior.
From the equation (2.2), it can be shown that the equilibrium or fixed points of 
the Lorenz system satisfy the following condition:
I x = y
< x(p — 1 — z) — 0 (2.3)
X  =  ± y / P ~ Z  =  ± y / p ( p -  1)
Notice that, when p < 1, there is only one fixed point: 0(0, 0, 0). When p > 1, there 
are three distinct fixed points, given by:
( 0 (0, 0. 0)
- p+(VMpzrr,VMp:rX),P-1) (2-4)
. P - ( - v W p - 1) . - V / % > - 1) ,/» -  1)
14
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For the fixed point: 0 (0 ,0 ,0 ), it is easy to obtain the Jacobi matrix evaluated a 
this point, which is given by:
A =
and the eigenvalue equation
(/? +  A) ((a +  A)(l +  A) — pa) =  0, 
with the eigenvalues, given by:
-a  a 0





A2,3 =  0.5(—(cr +  1) ±  v V  +  !)2 -  M l  -  p))-
Clearly, Aii2,3 < 0 with p < 1, which means that the fixed point 0 (0 ,0 ,0 ) is a stable 
point, as shown in Figure 2.2(a). When p > 1, from the equation (2.7), it can be 
concluded that A2 > 0, while A3 < 0, implying that the fixed point 0 (0 ,0,0) becomes 
the saddle point1.
For the fixed points P + and P ~ , the Jacobi matrix can be expressed as follows:
—a a 0
21=  1 - 1  - s / 0 ( p -  1)
v W p - 1 )  V 0 (f> -  ! )  - 0
The corresponding eigenvalue equation is given by:
A3 +  {a + P + 1)A2 +  p(a  + p) A +  2j3a{p — 1) =  0. 
Now, we set a value of parameter p as
Ph
(2.8)
a {a +  (3 +  3)
(2.9)
(2.10)
a — P — 1
For example, if we take the values of parameters as Lorenz did, i.e., a =  10 and
O
(3 =  then -ph =  24.74. It can be seen that if the parameter p can be chosen such
1 Saddle point is the fixed point that attract trajectories on one side but repel them on the other.
15
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that p < Ph, the equation (2.9) has three real negative eigenvalues or one real negative 
eigenvalue and two complex conjugate eigenvalues with the negative real part. This 
means that P + and P~ become attracting fixed points, implying that the trajectories 
are attracted to one or the other of the two fixed points, as Figure 2.2(b-c) show. On 
the other hand, if the parameter p is chosen as p > ph, the equation (2.9) has one 
real negative eigenvalue and two complex conjugate eigenvalues with the positive real 
part, which means that the fixed points P + and P~ become the saddle points, which 







(c) p =  22 (d) p =  28
Figure 2.2: Behavior of the Lorenz system with different value of parameters
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2.2 Chaos
Through the examples illustrated above we have a vivid comprehension for the 
chaos phenomenon. Chaos represents a kind of very complex dynamical behaviour 
more complicated than the familiar steady state or cyclic patterns occuring in a  fairly 
simple system without any external noise and perturbation. Before engaging in more 
serious discussion about the applications of chaos and chaotic systems, it is necessary 
to study them theoretically.
2.2.1 W hat Is Chaos?
There is not yet a unified, universally accepted, rigorous definition of chaos in 
the current scientific literature; nevertheless, it can be depicted in several different 
but closely related ways.
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions, which is also named the “Butterfly 
Effect” (Lorenz 1993), would be considered as the essence of chaos by many scien­
tists. It is believed that the term “chaos” first appeared in the famous paper “Period 
Three Implies Chaos” published by T. Li and J.A. Yorke to refer to a kind of un­
usual, and irregular movement, presented by some dynamical systems (Li and Yorke 
1975). In 1986, at a conference on mathematical chaos held by the Royal Society in 
London, mathematicians were asked to define “chaos” that had become the buzzword 
for their hot research area. After much deliberation, chaos is formally defined as the  
s to ch a stic  behaviour occurring  in  a d e te rm in is tic  s y s te m  (Stewart 1990).
2.2.2 Classification of Chaos
Based on the type of dynamical systems, the chaos phenomenon can be classified 
into two different categories: continuous-time chaos and discrete-time chaos.
17
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Continuous-Tim e Chaos
Continuous-time chaos is the erratic and irregular behaviour presented by contin­
uous chaotic systems, for example, the Lorenz system. A very common representation 
of these systems is that of a system of n-simultaneous first order ordinary differential 
equations (ODE’s) given by the following equation:
dx „. . .
^  =  / ( M ) .  (2.11)
where x (t) E R” are the state variables of the system, and 0 < t < oo.
Generally, the bounded steady-state behaviour of the continuous-time chaotic 
systems is not an equilibrium point, not periodic and not quasi-periodic. The limit­
ing trajectories of these systems are attracted to a region in state space which forms 
a set having fractional dimension and zero volume, which means that these sets are 
not simple geometrical objects like a circle or a torus. Since the trajectories, in this 
limiting set, are locally unstable, yet remain bounded within some region of the sys­
tem’s state space, these sets are termed strange attractor or chaotic attractor (Hilborn 
1994).
Clearly, the Lorenz system, introduced above, is a continuous-time chaotic sys­
tem, and other typical examples of the continuous time chaotic systems are:
The Chua’s oscillator, given by
| f  =  a ( y - x - f ( x ))
< elf = x~y + z (2-12)
. i  =  - P v - i * ’
where f ( x)  = bx + \{a  — 6)(| x  +  1 | — | x  — 1 |) with a < b < 0, and a , (3 and 7 are 
positive constants.
The Rossler system, given by
ax + y
—x — z (2.13)
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where a, b and c are positive constants.
The trajectories of these two chaotic systems, as shown in Figure 2.3, lie inside 
bounded but locally unstable regions with wells being the strange attractors men­
tioned earlier.
(a) Trajectory of Chua’s system (b) Trajectory of Rossler system
Figure 2.3: The chaotic behaviour of the Chua’s system and the Rossler system
D iscrete-T im e Chaos
Now, for discrete-time chaotic systems, similar features that we have seen for 
the case of continuous-time chaotic systems can also be found, although they follow 
different formulation. This formulation is expressed by a map /  from a set S  onto 
itself, that is,
xn+1 = f ( x n,a ), n = 0 ,1 ,2 ,..., (2.14)
- - T r i
where x n  = % nl %n 2 nm are the state variables and a — a  i  a 2 . OCp
are parameters of the system. Generally, the trajectories of the dynamical variables 
x n is computed by iterating it; i.e., given an initial value xq, we can compute X\ and 
then using X\ compute x^, and so on (Lakshmanan and Rajasekar 2003). Similar 
to the continuous-time case, the trajectories of discrete chaotic systems are never
19
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attracted into an equilibrium point or become periodic but they are aperiodic and 
random-like, that is, chaotic. The example of the logistic map discussed at the be­
ginning of this chapter is a discrete-time chaotic system.
2.2.3 Characteristics of Chaotic System s
We now take up briefly the problem of characterizing the chaos phenomenon 
presented by dynamical systems. Although chaos and chaotic systems have been dis­
covered and extensively studied for fewer than forty years, and the complete knowl­
edge of this very unusual phenomenon has not been obtained yet, there are still three 
fundamental features that can be used to identify whether or not we face a chaotic 
system.
(1) Com bination of stochasticity  and determinism.
Chaotic systems present an internal stochasticity which make the systems lo­
cally unstable; namely, the movement of chaotic systems appears irregular, seemingly 
random and its long-term behaviour can not be predicted. The internal stochas­
ticity is used mainly to distinguish it from the external stochasticity, which is the 
random motion caused by external random excitation. Usually, a system is consid­
ered to be stochastic if some state of the system can appear or disappear, under 
certain conditions. The internal stochasticity is the stochastic character produced 
spontaneously by a completely deterministic system under certain system parameter 
conditions (Chen and Leung 1998).
Thus, although chaos has the internal stochasticity, it should be clear tha t chaos 
is not a completely random phenomenon. The chaotic behaviour arises in very simple 
systems which are essentially deterministic, implying that from moment to moment 
the system is evolving in a deterministic way, that is, the current state of a system 
depends upon the previous state in a rigidly determined way. This is in contrast to 
a random system such as the game of playing dice, where the present state has no
20
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causal connection to the previous one (Rasband 1990).
(2) S en sitiv ity  to  in itia l conditions.
W hat is closely related to the internal stochasticity is the property that chaotic 
systems are sensitively dependent on initial conditions. For regular dynamical sys­
tems, a small variation in initial conditions, caused by intrinsic and external noise 
perturbation, will result in a small change of the system state. In other words, the 
evolution of a dynamical system, exhibiting a regular behaviour for two specifications 
of initial states, that are initially very close together, is always similar and even iden­
tic. This makes it possible to predict the future state of that regular system.
On the contrary, for a chaotic system, due to the intrinsic property of internal 
stochasticity in the system, even the smallest change in initial conditions will lead 
trajectories diverging from each other exponentially. Such a property is often called 








-20O 5 1 O 20 25 30
Figure 2.4: Two trajectories started with the initial state xQ =  1 
(the broken line) and x'0 =  1.001 (the solid line)
Here, we take the Lorenz system, referring to equation (2.2), as an instance to 
demonstrate this very important property for chaotic systems. We run the equation 
with two nearby initial conditions for the same value of parameters that make the 
Lorenz system behave chaotically, and study the difference between the two resultant 
solutions of the state variable x. Figure 2.4 shows the trajectories for two initial
21
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O
conditions with a =  10, j3 — |  and p — 28. One orbit (the broken line) starts from 
£0 =  1, &nd another one (the solid line) starts from xq =  1.001. As we see, in the 
beginning, the trajectories overlap, but later, they separate quite a bit, displaying the 
divergence of nearby trajectories.
Since there is always some imprecision in specifying initial conditions in any real 
experiment, it can be noticed that the actual future behaviour of a chaotic system 
is in fact unpredictable. This essential feature of chaotic systems was once vividly 
referred to the “Butterfly effect” by Lorenz. He stated that, owing to the sensibility 
of the system to the initial conditions, only a little flap of the butterfly’s wings can 
make the meteorologist unable to predict the weather in a month.
(3) N onlinearity .
For a linear differential equation, given definite initial conditions would yield a 
determined solution. This implies that linear systems can not have a chaotic behav­
iour; therefore, it can be pointed out that chaos only appears in non-linear systems. 
Certainly, nonlinearity is only a necessary condition but not sufficient for the ap­
pearance of chaos, that is, chaotic behaviour must come via non-linear systems but 
nonlinearity does not necessarily imply chaotic behaviour.
2.2.4 Lyapunov Exponents
As we have seen deterministic chaos is associated with random-like behaviour 
arising from the sensitivity to initial conditions. Thus, we would like to have some 
specific quantitative measures in order to recognize chaos and sort out true chaotic 
behaviour from just noisy behaviour or erratic behaviour due to the complexity. In­
deed, there are many such quantitative measures available in the literature for this 
purpose and the most prominent of them is the Lyapunov exponents (Eckmann and 
Ruelle 1985).
For a chaotic system, the Lyapunov exponents measure essentially the aver-
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Figure 2.5: Trajectories starting from two nearby points
age divergence rate of nearby trajectories in the phase space. Suppose x(t) is the 
trajectory of the following nonlinear dynamical system:
x = f (x ) ,  r G R "  (2.15)
We consider two trajectories x(t) and x'(t), shown in Figure 2.5, in a n-dimensional 
space starting from two nearby points x0 and x'Q. Let d(t) =  x(t) — x'[t) represents 
the measure of the distance between the two trajectories x(t) and x'(t). We can find 
that the change of the distance between the two orbits can be expressed by
d(t) ~  d0eXit, i = l ,2 , . . . ,n .  (2-16)
where are called the Lyapunov exponents. If there exists one positive Lyapunov ex­
ponent, the distance between the two trajectories, that is d(t), changes exponentially 
fast, implying sensitive dependence on initial conditions; therefore, the motion is said 
to be chaotic. Consequently, finding a single positive Lyapunov exponent is sufficient 
to confirm the existence of chaos. When more than one of the Lyapunov exponents 
are positive, then the motion is referred to as hyperchaos (Wolf et al. 1985).
We often consider computing the largest Lyapunov exponent for a dynamical 
system, measuring the maximal average rate of separation of nearby states. A simple 
procedure has been developed by Benettin et al., which estimates the largest Lya­
punov exponent directly from the equations governing the system (Benettin et al. 
1976). In (Wolf et al. 1985), the authors generalized Benettin’s method to time series 
data, known as Wolf’s method. Although Wolf’s paper only discussed the computa­
tion of non-negative Lyapunov exponents, it can be used effectively to compute the
23
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largest Lyapunov exponent of a chaotic system.
2.3 Generalized Lorenz System
For later convenience, we now introduce a general class of continuous-time chaotic 
systems, which is called the generalized Lorenz system.
As described above, the original Lorenz system (2.2) was discovered about 40 
years ago, which has played a very important role in the study of chaos theory. After 
that, some other similar chaotic systems have been discovered one after another, such 
as the Chen system (Chen and Ueta 1999; Ueta and Chen 2000) and the Lii system 
(Lii and Chen 2002), which are described by (2.17) and (2.18), respectively, as follows
- a ( x  -  y )
(p — a)x  — xz  +  py (2-17)
xy  — fiz
-<j(x -  y)
- x z  + py (2-18)
xy  — pz.
W ith the appropriately chosen parameters system (2.17) and (2.18) can present a 
very complex behaviour, that is chaotic, as shown in Figure 2.6(a) and Figure 2.6(b).
As a m atter of fact, it was pointed out that, according to the system struc­
tures, all chaotic systems, mentioned above, can be classified into a very large and 
general class of relevant chaotic systems, named the generalized Lorenz system (GLS) 
(Celikovsky and Chen 2002), which can be expressed by the following definition.
D efin ition  2.3.1. The following general class of three-dimensional nonlinear systems
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(a) Trajectory of Chen system (b) Trajectory of Lii system
Figure 2.6: The chaotic behaviour of the Chen system and the Lii system 
of ordinary differential equations is called a generalized Lorenz system (GLS):
x = A x  +  (C x )B x ,
an O12 0 0 0 0
A = 021 0-22 0 , B  = 0 0 - 1
0 0 a 3 0 1 0
and C 1 0 0
(2.19)
where x  =  x\ x 2 x$ ■ The generalized Lorenz system is said to be nontrivial i f  it 
has at least one solution that goes neither to a constant nor to infinity nor to a limit 
cycle.
In order to render the system (2.19) exhibit chaotic behaviour, the matrix A  has 
to be chosen in such a way that the following inequality must be satisfied:
—A2 > Ai > —A3 > 0, (2 .20)
where Ai_3 € M are the eigenvalues of the matrix A  (Wiggins 1988). Since this is 
the only requirement, the generalized Lorenz system (2.19) represents a quite general 
class of three-dimensional autonomous systems.
Moreover, in the work of (Celikovsky and Chen 2002), the authors found that 
there exists a nonsingular linear transformation of coordinates, by which the system
25
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(2.19) can be transformed into a form, called the generalized Lorenz canonical form. 
This generalized Lorenz canonical form can be given as the following definition.
D efin ition  2.3.2. The following general class of three-dimensional nonlinear sys­
tem of ordinary differential equations is called a generalized Lorenz canonical form  
(GLCF):
z — A z + (C z )B z ,
Ai 0 0 0 0 - 1
A  = 0 A2 0 , B  = 0 0 - 1
0 0 A3 1 K 0




z l  z 2 z 3 and k £  (—1, oo).
Notice that there is only one scalar real parameter k in GLCF, which plays a 
subtle tuning role for the chaotic behaviour of the system. Further study of GLCF 
reveals that it represents a family of chaotic systems with only one parameter k . 
When — 1 < k < 0, it represents the Chen system and when k =  0, it represents the 
Lii system, while it represents the Lorenz system in the case of 0 < k < oo.
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Chapter 3 
Chaos and Cryptography
Chaos theory, which has brought to our attention a surprising fact that simple 
dynamical systems are able to exhibit a very complex and unpredictable behaviour, 
consistently plays an active role in modern cryptography. It is the every special char­
acteristic of random-like behaviour and extreme sensitivity to initial conditions and 
parameter settings, presented by chaotic systems, that attract people to use chaos 
as the basis for developing the new cryptosystem, since these properties seem per­
fectly satisfying the classic Shannon requirements of confusion and diffusion (Shannon 
1949). In an ideal cryptosystem, the confusion property decreases the correlativity 
between the original message and the encrypted message, while the diffusion property 
guarantees that the data at some coordinates in the input message block is relocated 
to other coordinates in the output message block (Schneier 1996). In other words, we 
can say that diffusion changes the position of data in a message, while the data  itself 
is modified during the confusion process. Furthermore, the fast encryption rate and 
the ease of implementing chaotic systems into both hardware and software also make 
the application of chaotic dynamics in cryptography particularly attractive.
It is worth to notice that a deep relation between chaos and cryptography has 
not been established yet. An important difference between chaos and cryptography 
lies on the fact that systems used in chaos are defined only on real numbers, while 
cryptography deals with systems defined on finite number of integers (Gickenheimer
27
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and Holmes 1983; Schneier 1996). Nevertheless, it is believed that these two disci­
plines can benefit from each other. Thus, for example, as we show in this chapter, new 
cryptographic algorithms can be derived from chaotic systems. On the other hand, 
chaos theory may also benefit from cryptography: new methods and techniques for 
chaos analysis may be developed from cryptography.
3.1 Basic Principles of Cryptography
Suppose a message is to be transferred from one party (transmitter) to another 
(receiver) across some sort of public channel, for instance, the Internet. The two par­
ties, the transmitter and receiver, must cooperate for the transmission of a message 
to occur. Security aspects come into play when it is desirable or necessary to protect 
the message transmission from an intruder who may present a threat to confiden­
tiality or authenticity. There are various techniques that can be used to provide the 
protection for the message, among which the most common method used in practice 
is the encryption or encryption-like transformation of the message. This technique 
refers to a very important discipline, called cryptography, which is defined to be the 
science and art of converting a legible message, for the protection against passive 
and active fraud. An overview of recent developments in the design of conventional 
cryptographic algorithms is given in (Preneel et al. 1998).
In the domain of cryptography, a encryption system is also called a cipher, or a 
cryptosystem. The message before being encrypted in any way is called the plaintext, 
and the encrypted message is called the ciphertext. The process of disguising a mes­
sage in such a way as to hide its substance is encryption. Similarly, the decryption 
is the process of turning the ciphertext back into the plaintext. The operation of 
encryption or decryption depends on two components: the cryptographic algorithm 
and the key. The cryptographic algorithm is the mathematical function used to en­
crypt and decrypt the message and the key is a piece of information that controls the
28
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operation of the cryptographic algorithm to produce a unique result for a particular 
user. In key-based cryptosystem, the key is required for both the encryption and 
decryption processes; the key specifies the particular transformation of the plaintext 
into the ciphertext, or vice versa, during the process of decryption. Therefore, only if 
the key being used for decryption matches that being used for encryption procedure, 
the encrypted message can be decrypted correctly. By following Kerckhoffs’s princi­
ple, the security of a cryptosystem should only rely on the “key” , since adversaries 
can only recover the plaintext from the observed ciphertext when they get the correct 
key, and the longer the key, the more time and computing power it takes to crack the 
cryptographical scheme. It should be emphasized here, that the whole idea behind 
cryptography is not to make the cryptographical methods crack-proof, but to make 
breaking it more costly than the value of the message being protected (Schneier 1996).
The most general form of a cryptosystem can be illustrated as Figure 3.1. Denote 
the plaintext and the ciphertext by P  and C, respectively. The encryption procedure 
can be described as C =  E ks{P), where K e is the encryption key and E(-) is the 
encryption function. Analogously, the decryption procedure is P  = D Kd(C), where 
Kd is the decryption key and D(-) is the decryption function.
K e K d
Plaintext Ciphertext f 
Public channel
Recovered plaintextEncryption Decryption
Figure 3.1: The general cryptosystem
3.2 Conventional and Chaotic Cryptography
It is clear from the above demonstration that the complexity and the secrecy of 
the key, used for encryption-decryption purposes, play a major role in the security of 
the desired cryptosystem. It is used as the tool to complement the security-related
29
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transformation in encrypting messages, thereby, it has to be generated as randomly 
as possible. In other words, the key generators must be able to be operated in the 
unpredictably random way in order to add more uncertainty into the cryptosystem, 
making it less vulnerable.
Due to the importance of randomness in cryptography, recently the use of chaos 
for data encryption has received much more consideration, since chaotic signals are 
broadband, noise-like and difficult to predict. In fact, chaotic systems are very sen­
sitive to the changes in initial conditions and parameters, which make them behave 
in an unpredictable pattern. This would be considered a good source of random­
ness needed for a good cryptosystem. For this reason, in the last ten years many 
cryptographical approaches based on chaos phenomenon have been proposed and a 
relatively new branch of modern cryptography has been developed, that is, the chaotic 
cryptography in contrast to the conventional cryptography.
When it comes to conventional cryptography, cryptosystems operate on discrete 
values and in discrete time. In fact, since its ancient beginnings, cryptosystems have 
been almost exclusively applied to the discrete-value message. These systems range 
from the so called Caesar cipher, to the well known Vigenere Cipher, up to the modern 
encryption algorithms, like data encryption standard (DES) or the asymmetrical al­
gorithm by Rivest, Shamir and Adelman (RSA) (Schneier 1996). On the other hand, 
for chaotic cryptography, the continuous-value message and the usage of continuous- 
value systems, which may operate in continuous or discrete time, become the crucial 
points in it. To emphasize its difference to conventional cryptography, we shall use the 
term continuous-value cryptography synonymously with chaotic encryption or chaotic 
cryptography. In our understanding, it is just a necessity to utilize nonlinearities and 
to force the system dynamics into a chaotic operation to fulfill basic cryptographical 
requirements in the continuous-value case (Dachselt and Schwarz 2001).
Hence, the most important difference between conventional and chaotic cryp­
tosystems is the domain of the involved elementary signals, which is called the symbol 
level, describing the smallest pieces of which the stream of information is composed.
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Since conventional cryptosystems operate on discrete signals, the plaintext, the ci­
phertext and the key are elements of finite sets no matter whether these are bits, 
integer numbers or some kind of metasymbols. Usually, the symbol level of conven­
tional cryptosystems is binary. On the contrary, in discrete-time continuous-value 
cryptosystems plaintexts, ciphertexts and keys are in general real values, so the sym­
bol level is the real axis or an interval of it. The case of continuous-time continuous- 
value cryptosystems is even more complicated. The whole plaintext and ciphertext 
time functions are usually considered as elements of the symbol level, because there 
is no strict mathematical method that can be used to break this information down 
into smaller units. Figure 3.2 illustrates the comparison of symbol level domains for 
conventional and chaotic cryptosystems.
St .  0 1 0  1 1 1 0  1...
I I I I I I I I 







Figure 3.2: Different classes of encryption systems
3.3 Chaotic Cryptosystem s
In chaotic cryptography, chaotic systems are utilized in two major different ways 
for encrypting two different types of message data. The early attempts of using chaos 
in cryptography were in the conventional way, namely, in discrete-value and discrete­
time implementation, and was for encrypting the digital message (Matthews 1989; 
Habutsu et al. 1991; Li et al. 2001). In these applications, chaotic systems, usually 
discrete-time chaotic systems, were used as a pseudo-random number generator for
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the encryption purpose. Since this kind of cryptosystem uses chaotic systems in­
stead of the conventional way to generate pseudo-random numbers, it is also called 
the chaos-based cipher. The other approach of chaotic cryptosystems is based on 
the synchronization of continuous-time chaotic systems, and is generally designed for 
secure communications where, usually, the analog signals, for instance voice signals, 
are encrypted and transfered within a given network, thereby called chaotic secure 
communications.
3.3.1 Chaos-Based Cipher










Chaotic binary 1 0  0 1 1 . . .
Xn —
State X
f 1 x n > Ax n — <
1 0 x n <  A
State X
Chaotic system Chaotic system
Key KChaotic binary sequence
generator ---------------
T ransmitter Receiver
Figure 3.3: Schematic diagram of the chaos-based cipher
For the chaos-based cipher, Figure 3.3 shows its schematic diagram. W ithout 
loss of generality, we assume that the message transmitted from the transm itter is a 
binary file consisting of a chain of 0’s and l ’s. Before the transmission of the binary 
message takes place, the transm itter and the receiver have previously agreed to use 
the same n-dimensional discrete chaotic dynamical algorithm governed by equation
(2.14) for the encryption and decryption purpose.
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The encryption procedure can be expressed as this. As the first step, the trans­
mitter searches for a sequence of the original message of a fixed size specified by a 
parameter. Then the chaotic dynamics is turned on with arbitrary initial conditions 
and/or parameters, set by the key K  to generate the same size sequence of real num­
bers by iterating it. After that, a threshold A  is chosen for the real number sequence 
to construct the chaotic binary sequence by this convention: if x n > A  it is set as 1, 
and if x < A  it is set as 0. Once the chaotic binary sequence is generated, the XOR 
operation can be applied to the message binary file and the chaotic binary sequence, 
and then we get the encrypted binary sequence. The same process is carried on for 
remaining parts of the original message and, finally, the ciphertext would be obtained.
In order to decrypt the ciphertext and retrieve the original message data again, 
the procedure described above is simply repeated at the receiver side. Since we use 
the key K  to set the initial conditions and parameters, upon which the chaotic dy­
namical system is extremely dependent in the sense that two arbitrarily close initial 
values will result in totally different systems states, this means that even the slightest 
difference of the key K  will make the generated chaotic binary sequence completely 
unuseful. In other words, it can be said that only with the precise knowledge of the 
key K  one can recover the ciphertext successfully.
Here, we give an example to demonstrate the implementation of the chaos-based 
cipher. In this example, we use the logistic equation (2.1) as the chaotic binaxy 
sequence generator to design a chaos-based cipher, and then use it to encrypt and 
decrypt an image file. Moreover, in this example, we use two sets of keys, k\ is for 
the parameter /r =  4 and ^  is the initial value of xq — 0.6. Figure 3.4 illustrates the 
results of encrypting and decrypting an image file.
3.3.2 Chaotic Secure Communications
The approach of chaotic secure communications, referring to dealing with con­
tinuous value information by using continuous-time chaotic systems, for instance, the
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(a) Original image (b) Encrypted image with keys: 
k\ — fl — 4, k,2 — Xq =  0.6
(c) Decrypted image with correct keys: (d) Decrypted image with partial wrong
k\ =  fj, =  4, /c2 =  xo =  0.6 keys: k\ =  fi =  4.001, /c2 =  xo =  0.6
Figure 3.4: Example of encrypting and decrypting an image 
file with a chaos-based cipher
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Lorenz equation (2.2), was mainly promoted by the pioneering work of Pecora and 
Carroll. In (Pecora and Carroll 1990; Pecora and Carroll 1991), the authors proposed 
to use stable subsystems of given chaotic systems to construct unidirectionally cou­
pled synchronization systems1. Moreover, Pecora and Carroll noticed that by adding 
a continuous message signal with a small amplitude to the chaotic signal, the syn­
chronization of two chaotic systems can still be obtained, if they have the exact same 
parameters in the system equations, which can be considered as the private key for 
this secure communication system. Thereafter, the idea of using two synchronous 
chaotic systems, for secure communications, has received a great deal of interest, and 
several secure communication methods, such as: the chaotic masking, chaotic modu­
lation and chaotic switching have been successfully developed based on the realization 
of synchronization of two chaotic systems.
In conventional communication systems, the signal carriers are usually the peri­
odic sinusoidal signals because they can increase the bandwidth efficiency for com­
munication systems. However, the transmitted power of the sinusoidal signals is 
concentrated within a narrow band, which leads to a high power spectral density. 
As a result, some unwanted problems may occur. For example, the synchronization 
between the transm itter and receiver may be destroyed due to high attenuation over 
a narrow frequency band; the interference among users on the system may be exac­
erbated; the possibilities of intercepting the message may increase. On the contrary, 
chaotic signals are usually broadband and noise-like, which are suitable to be used 
to design a secure communication system, for the secure transmission of analog and 
digital message signals (Chen and Dong 1998).
The common feature of most existing chaotic secure communication algorithms 
is that a scalar chaotic signal is used for transmitting message signals. Usually, the 
most general form of the communication system requires two components, each of 
which consists of a chaotic system, identical in most cases. One of these two compo­
nents is called the transm itter and the other one is called the receiver, as Figure 3.5
1More detail will be discussed in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.5: The chaotic secure communication system
shows. The basic idea of this kind of chaotic cryptosystems is to use, at the transm it­
ter side, a chaotic system to generate the broadband noise-like chaotic carrier signal 
with the cryptographic key. By a proper modulation and encryption operation, the 
private message signal is hidden in the chaotic carrier signal and becomes an unin­
telligible signal, which is then transmitted over the public channel to the receiver. 
At the receiver, the chaotic carrier signal is regenerated by the synchronous chaotic 
system, so that by combining it with the received signal, through the inverse modu­
lation and encryption operation, the original message signal can be extracted. The 
peculiarity of the chaotic secure communication lies in the message signal extraction 
process, which is based on synchronization phenomena between the transm itter and 
the receiver. This phenomena is required for successful message recovery, since only 
the completely synchronized receiver is capable of reconstructing the chaotic carrier 
signal. Due to the properties of great sensitivity to initial conditions and parameter 
settings of chaotic systems, it is believed that the chaotic receiver will only synchro­
nize with the transmitter, if it has exactly the same parameter settings with the 
transmitter. Thus, these parameter settings can be considered as the secrete “Key” 
for a chaotic secure communication system (Dachselt and Schwarz 2001).
Since the synchronization of chaotic systems plays a central role in the recover­
ing process of the private message signal for this kind of chaotic cryptosystems, here, 
we only introduce it briefly, and we shall describe it thoroughly in the next chapter, 
after introducing the concept of chaos synchronization.
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Chapter 4 
Chaos Synchronization
Synchronization, which usually refers to the coherence of different processes due 
to a coupling or to a forcing, is the basic phenomenon appearing in wide range of 
real systems, such as in biology, neural networks, physiological process, and so on. 
Although this phenomenon appears to be quite regular, when applied to periodic os­
cillations, the thought that two systems, each running chaotically, could synchronize 
with each other sounds quite inconceivable. Indeed, there is an essential difference 
between the synchronization of periodic oscillations and synchronization of chaotic 
systems. In the former case the oscillations do not have intrinsic instability and 
stochasticity which are common features of chaotic systems, whereas, in systems os­
cillating chaotically, it has been seen that infinitesimally nearby initial conditions 
trigger quite distinct evolutions. As a result, chaotic systems intrinsically defy syn­
chronization, because even two identical systems, starting from slightly different initial 
conditions, would evolve in time in an unsynchronized manner. Considering this, it 
would seem rather pointless to attem pt to synchronize chaotic systems in any sense 
(Chen and Dong 1998).
It was only until 1990, Pecora and Carroll discovered that a particular class of 
chaotic systems possesses a self-synchronization property, which means that by ar­
ranging these chaotic systems in a specific way, the identical chaotic behaviour could 
be achieved for these chaotic systems even if they were isolated, implying that it
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is possible to design a synchronizing system driven by chaotic signals (Pecora and 
Carroll 1990; Pecora and Carroll 1991). This striking discovery has attracted con­
siderable interest among researchers from various disciplines. The motivation of the 
investigations has come from potential applications of this phenomenon to secure 
communications, model verification of nonlinear dynamics and many other areas.
Up to now, there are several different categories of chaos synchronization. Most 
frequently, chaos synchronization is studied where a complete system consists of uni- 
directionally coupled identical subsystems, as described by Pecora and Carroll. In 
this case, the synchronization appears as an actual equality of the corresponding state 
variables of the coupled systems as they evolve over time. In other words, it implies 
that all state trajectories of the synchronized chaotic systems asymptotically con­
verge to each other in the course of the time. We refer to this type of synchronization 
as identical synchronization or complete synchronization. Another situation is when 
coupled chaotic systems are not identical. This kind of problems has been reported by 
Rulkov and his colleagues in (Rulkov et al. 1995) where two unidirectionally coupled 
chaotic systems are called synchronized if a static functional relation exists between 
the states of both systems. This kind of synchronization is usually termed as gener­
alized synchronization.
In this chapter, we shall focus on the realization of the identical synchronization 
of chaotic systems and its application to secure communications.
4.1 Synchronization of Chaotic System s
Considering the complex behaviour of chaotic dynamical systems, it is interest­
ing to wonder whether we can find some mechanisms for externally influencing the 
functioning of chaotic systems and, on the other hand, how we can possibly uti­
lize the amazing ability for performing other useful tasks such as signal processing. 
These questions and many more may be answered through investigating the concept
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of chaos synchronization. Therefore, we shall study the synchronization problem of 
two chaotic systems using different approaches that have been proposed so far in the 
literature. Each method will be investigated thoroughly and an example will be pro­
vided for each one of them.
The first thing to be highlighted is that the most common process, leading to 
synchronized states of chaotic systems, refers to the so-called drive-response coupling 
configuration, consisting of two chaotic dynamical systems, one of which generates 
driving signals, so it is called the drive system (or the driving system), and the other 
is driven by these signals and then it is called the response system (or the driven 
system). This implies that one chaotic system evolves freely and drives the evolution 
of the other. As a result, the response system is slaved to follow the dynamics of 
the drive system, which, instead, purely acts as an external but chaotic forcing for 
the response system. Based on this situation the definition of synchronization can be 
introduced in the general sense as follows:
D efin ition  4.1.1. Given a drive system of variables x(t), with dynamics governed 
by a continuous-time nonlinear dynamical system, given by equation (2.11), and an 
identical response system of variables x(t), it is said that there is synchronization if
lim |) x(t) — x(t) ||=  0. (4.1)
t —too
Notice that it is clear from this definition that the synchronization of two dynamical 
systems means that trajectories of one of the two systems will converge to the same 
values of the other one and will remain in step for the future time. This makes the 
synchronization appear to be structurally stable.
4.1.1 Pecora-Carroll’s Approach
Consider the n-dimensional autonomous dynamical system, whose temporal evo­
lution is governed by equation (2.11). We suppose that the system can be arbitrarily
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divided into three components:
ii = f ( u , v ) (4.2a)
v — g(u,v)  (4.2b)
w = h(u,w)  (4.2c)
where u = (u i,u2, ...,um)T, v =  {vi,v2, ...,vk)T, w — (wi,w2, ...,wi)T, and n = m + k +  
I. The first two components (4.2a) and (4.2b) represent the drive subsystem, whereas 
the last equation (4.2c) represents the response component which is then called the 
response subsystem. We now create a new subsystem with variables w' identical to 
the response subsystem of equation (4.2c), given by
w' — h{u,w') (4.3)
where u{t) is the driving signal.
For the system described by equations (4.2), the chaos synchronization can be 
expressed as this: giving the same chaotic driving signal u(t) for the response subsys­
tem (4.2c) and its replica (4.3), at the moment t  =  to, generally e(t0) is not equal to 
zero, where e(t) is the synchronization error defined by e(t) = || w(t) — w'(t) ||. But 
as the time approaches to infinity, it yields that lim^oo || e(t) ||=  0. This means that 
the trajectories of two systems, starting from different initial conditions, will converge 
under the action of the chaotic driving signal.
The key problem is how to guarantee that, for a fixed set of drive initial condi­
tions, wherever w'(t) starts, it would always converge to the trajectory of the subsys­
tem (4.2c), that is w(t), and at each point of time always be at the same predictable 
place on that trajectory. This leads to the linear variational expansion for the response 
subsystem, given by
e =  h(u, w ') — h(u, w) = Jwh(u, w)e + 0 (w , u) (4.4)
where Jwh is the Jacobian matrix of the w subsystem vector field with respect to the 
variable w only, and 0{w)  represents the higher-order terms. In the limit of small e,
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the behaviour of equation (4.4) depends on the Lyapunov exponents of the response
subsystem w for the particular driving signal u(t), which are called conditional Lya­
punov exponents. In (Pecora and Carroll 1990; Pecora and Carroll 1991), it has been 
shown that the necessary and sufficient condition for the trivial solution of equation 
(4.4) to be asymptotically stable is that all of conditional Lyapunov exponents1 are 
negative. Such a condition can be met if u(t) is a synchronizing signal. However, 
given a chaotic system , not all possible options of the driving signal lead to a syn­
chronized state, as we shall show momentarily.
Let us describe this procedure using an example of the Lorenz system introduced 
in the former chapter. Its dimensionless equation is given by
x — —a(x  — y )
y =  — xz  +  px — y  (4.5)
z  = x y - p z ,
and it can be decomposed into three different response subsystems considering the
state x, y and z  as the driving signal, respectively, described as follows:
(1) x-drive response subsystem
y' — —xz' + px — y'
(4.6)
z' — xy' — Pz'
(2) y-drive response subsystem
x' =  —a(x' — y)
(4.7)
z = x'y  — Pz1
(3) z-drive response subsystem
x' — —a(x' — y')
(4.8)
y’ =  - x ’z + px' -  y'
1For the method to calculate Lyapunov exponents, refer to (Eckmann and Ruelle 1985).
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Notice that the dynamics of all of the response subsystems given above is independent 
of the original Lorenz system; therefore, the original Lorenz system (4.5) is considered 
as the drive system and its decomposed subsystems (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8) are regarded
O
as the response system. It can be shown that for a  =  10, (3 =  ^ and p = 60 giving 
rise to a chaotic dynamics drive and response systems can be synchronized only for 
the x — and y —drive response systems, as shown in Figure 4.1(a,b), since conditional 
Lyapunov exponents are (Ai =  —1.81, A2 =  —1.86), (Ai =  —2.67, A2 =  —10) and 
(Ai = 0.011, A2 — —11.01) respectively for x —, y — and z—drive response systems. 
This means that due to the slightly positive conditional Lyapunov exponent for the 
z-drive response system, its trajectory will not converge to that of the drive system 
even though there is a driving signal acting on it. Figure 4.1(c) demonstrates this 
result.
nmefsec)
(a) x-drive (b) y-drive (c) z-drive
Figure 4.1: Results of chaos synchronization from P-C approach
Thus, these two x — and y —drive response subsystems can converge to the corre­
sponding components of the original Lorenz system respectively. Notice that, these 
two subsystems can be combined together to construct a full-dimensional response 
system, which is structurally similar to the drive system (4.5) (Cuomo and Oppen- 
heim 1993). For example, if we consider the state x  of the system (4.5) as the driving
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signal, the full-dimensional dynamics of the response system can be given by:
x' — —a(x' — y')
y’ — - x z ' + px - y '  (4.9)
H = xy' — f3z'
In this case, it can be shown straightforwardly that the synchronization is a 
global property of the nonlinear error dynamics between the system (4.5) and (4.9) 
with the parameter <j, (3 > 0. First, let us define the synchronization error dynamics 
e =  {&i^2,e3)T as
e\ =  x — x' =  —cr(ei — e2)
62 =  y - y '  =  —e2 — xe3 (4.10)
e3 =  z  -  z' =  xe2 - f3 e 3.
Then we consider the Lyapunov function as
v  =  o ( “ e i  +  e2 +  ei) (4 -11 )Z <7
where a  is a positive constant. Taking the time derivative of V  along trajectories of 
the resulting error dynamical system (4.10) leads to
V  =  \ ei&i + e2e2 + e3e3
i o (4-12)
=  —(ei -  2 e2)2 -  \ e \  -  f3e%.
Therefore, it follows that V  < 0 for (3 > 0. According to the Lyapunov stability 
theory, it implies that the error dynamics converge to zero exponentially fast, that is
lim e(t) =  0. (4-13)
t —>oo
Figure 4.2 shows the synchronization between the drive system (4.5) and the 
full-dimensional response system (4.9).
4.1.2 Observer-based Synchronization
Notice that once the chaotic drive system is given, the above drive-response 
method does not give a systematic procedure to determine the response system and
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Figure 4.2: The components of the synchronization error for 
the drive system (4.5) and the full-dimensional response system (4.9)
the driving signal. Hence, it depends on the choice of the drive system and could not 
be easily generalized to an arbitrary chaotic drive system. This leaves some ambiguity 
as to what the actual response system should be, given a drive system. A natural 
attempt would be to consider the drive system as transmitting a driving signal to 
the response system and the response system is requested to recover the full state 
trajectory of the drive system. This problem is intimately related to the observer 
problem in control theory. Naturally, many efforts have been made to show that 
the synchronization problem of chaotic systems could be solved through the observer 
design approach, which has been then called observer-based synchronization. In this 
approach, for the given drive system, the response system could be chosen in the 
observer form, which is a copy of the drive system modified with a term depending 
on the difference between the received signal and its prediction. This additional term 
is used to attenuate the difference between the state of the designed drive system and 
the state of the observer system. Then under some relatively mild conditions, local 
or global synchronization of drive and observer systems can be guaranteed. Hence, 
this synchronization scheme offers a systematic procedure, independent of the choice 
of the drive system.
The observer-based synchronization method was proposed in (Grassi and Mascolo
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1997; Liao and Huang 1999; Alvarez-Ramirez et al. 2002) and first motivated by the 
work in (Peng et  al. 1996). Compared with Pecora-Carroll’s method, this approach 
does not require the computation of the conditional Lyapunov exponents or the ini­
tial conditions belonging to the same basin of attraction. Moreover, it guarantees 
synchronization of a wide class of chaotic systems, via a scalar synchronizing signal 
only. In order to illustrate how this method works, we shall consider synchronizing 
two identical n-dimensional chaotic systems through the observer design technique.
Consider the general nonlinear chaotic system (2.11) having the form given by
x =  A x + f ( x , y )  
y = C T x
where x G M" is the state, and y  E M is the output signal used as the synchronizing 
signal for the observer. The matrix A  € Rnxn and C E Mn are constants. Notice that 
in this case the noise description is not taken into account so this differential equation 
is deterministic. Moreover, /  : Mn —► Mn is assumed to be a real analytic vector field 
and satisfy the global Lipschitz condition in x, i.e., there exists a positive constant, 
called the Lipschitz constant, 7 , such that
(4.14)
f ( x , y )  -  f ( x , y )  j|< 7 II x - x (4.15)
for all x, x  E Mn and for all y E R. By following the method proposed by Rachavan 
and Hedrick (Raghavan and Hedrick 1994), the observer design can be described as 
follows. We assume that the linear part of equation (4.14) is observable, i.e., the pair 








is equal to n.
So now we can construct an observer for the system (4.14) in the following form:
x  =  A x + f{x ,  y) + L(y — CTx) (4-17)
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where i e i "  represents the dynamic estimate of the state x  and f ( x , y ) represents 
the estimated vector of f ( x ,y )  based on the estimated x. L £ W 1 is the observer 
gain vector chosen in such a way that (A  — LCT) is an exponentially stable matrix 
which is always possible since the pair (A, CT) is observable (Ogata 2002). Then 
for any symmetric and positive definite matrix Q £ Rnxra there exists a symmetric 
and positive definite matrix P  € MnXn such that the following well-known Lyapunov 
matrix equation is satisfied:
(A -  L C 1 y  P  + P (A  -  L C 1) =  - Q  (4.18)
Let us now define the error for the state estimate as e =  x — x  and by using
(4.14) and (4.17) we obtain the following error dynamics:
e =  { A -  LC T)e + f ( x ,y )  -  f ( x ,y )  (4.19)
By considering the positive definite Lyapunov function V(e) =  eTP e , it has been
shown that if
7  <  4 = ^  (4.20)
where the matrices P and Q are positive definite satisfying equation (4.18) and 
Amin(Q), ^max(P) denote the minimum and maximum eigenvalues of the matrices 
P  and Q, respectively. Then
lim e(t) =  0, (4-21)
i —► oo
implying that the designed observer (4.17) yields asymptotically stable estimates for 
the system (4.14) (Thau 1973).
To demonstrate the above observer design method for synchronization, we shall 
take a numerical example employing the Rossler system given by equation (2.13), 
which can be written in the form of system (4.14), with a =  0.2, b = 0.2 and c =  5 
exhibiting the chaotic behaviour, as follows:
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X A x + f ( x ,y )
-0 .2 0 0 V
- 1 0 - 1 x  + 0




0 1 0 x = x 2
where x  =  x i , x 2, x 2 and y is the synchronizing signal. Notice that, since the pair 
(A , CT) for the system (4.22) is observable, it can be concluded, by applying the above 
discussion, that there exists a gain vector L, such that a response system designed 
through the observer design approach can synchronize with the drive system for any 
initial state. The observer-based response system designed in the form of system
(4.17) is given as follows:
x = A x + f (x ,  y) +  L(y -  C^x)
- 0.2 0 0 y
- 1 0 - 1 x  + 0
0 0 - 5 0.2 +  x3y
+ L(y -  C Ti )
(4.23)
If the observer gain is chosen as L , it makes the matrix-2.1323 2.2 -2.3077 
(A — LC T) stable with the eigenvalues of —1, —2 and —4. Thus the error dynamics 






•15O 5 10 15
Time(sec)
20 25 30
Figure 4.3: The components of the synchronization error for system (4.22) and (4.23)
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B ru now sky C anonical Form
We now consider a special case of chaos synchronization on the basis of the 
observer design technique, where a particular way can be used to determine the 
observer gain vector L for the synchronization of two chaotic systems (4.14) and
(4.17).
Suppose that there exists a linear change of coordinates z =  Ox by which the 
chaotic drive system (4.14) can be transformed into the following so-called Brunowsky 
canonical form  (Ciccarella et al. 1993), given by




0 1 0 . . 0 -  _
0
0 0 1 . . 0
, B  =
0
0 0 0 . . 1
1
0 0 0 . . 0
C = 1 0
It can be proven that, since the nonlinearity f ( x ,y )  in the systems (4.14) is globally 
Lipschitz in x, 4>(z, y) in (4.24) is also globally Lipschitz in z (i.e. || <f>(z, y ) —cj)(z, y) ||<  
7* || z — z ||). Then, the corresponding observer system can be depicted as follows
z =  Az + B(p(z,y) + L ( y - y )  
y = Cz
(4.25)
where L  =  OL is the transformation of the observer gain vector L. We further 
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where 0:1,2,....n are some constants appropriately chosen in such a way to make the 
polynomial H (A) =  An 4- aiAn_1 +  • • • +  a n Hurwitz.
We now introduce the ^-scaled synchronization error:
e =  A( z -  z) (4.27)
where A =  diag(9n~1, 9n~2,..., 1).
Based on the equations of (4.24)-(4.27), we can obtain the following error dy­
namics:
e =  9(A -  L(l)C)e + AB(<p(z, y) -  <t>(z, y)). (4.28)
It can easily be shown that, with the appropriately chosen L(9) in the form (4.26),
the matrix (A — L(l)C)  is stable so that there is a symmetric and positive definite
matrix P  satisfying equation (4.18) with Q — I.
Now, we choose the Lyapunov function as V  =  eTPe, and then the time derivative 
of V  along the trajectories of system (4.28) is
V  = - 9 \ \ e \ \ 2 +2er P(AB(<t>(z,y)-<P(z,y))
< - 9  || e ||2 +2 || eTP(AB((f>(z, y) -  <p(z, y)) ||
<  - 9  || e ||2 +2 || e |||| P  |||| AB  |||| cf>(z,y) -  *(£ ,y )  ||
(4.29)
<  - 9  || e ||2 +2^zXmax(P)\b0\ || z  -  z  |||| e ||
< —9 || e ||2 + 27zAmax(P )|60|||A-1 || || e ||2
< - ( ^ - 2 7,Amax(P)|6o|||A-1||) | |e  ||2 .
where |60| =  || AP|| is a positive nonzero constant and the 7z is the Lipschitz constant. 
Clearly, the following inequality holds for all of 9 > 1:
V  < - { 9  -  2l z \ max{P)\b0\) || e ||2 . (4.30)
Once the parameter 9 is chosen appropriately such that 9 > max  {1, 27zAmax(P)|6o|}, 
we can conclude that V  < 0, which implies that, from standard Lyapunov arguments, 
the given chaotic drive system (4.14) and the designed observer (4.17) can be syn­
chronized, if the observer gain vector L  is chosen as
L{9) = 0 ~ 1L(9), 9 > m a x{  1, 2 jz\ max(P)\b0\} . (4.31)
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This method of designing the observer gain vector L provides a simple way to 
adjust the convergence rate of the synchronization errors by an appropriate choice 
of the parameter 0. In fact, since V(t) < V (0 jexp~(e~2'rzAmax<'P)lt>ol) ̂ the larger the 
value of 9, the faster the convergence of the trajectories of the drive and the observer 
system.
In order to illustrate the method discussed above, we still take the Rossler sys­
tem as an example to construct a synchronization system, so the linear change of 
coordinates can be chosen as:
z = Ox, O
1 0 0 
a 1 0
a2 — 1 a —1
(4.32)
With the same parameters as used in the previous example, the Rossler system (4.22) 
can be transformed into the form of system (4.24), given by:
i  =  A z  +  B<p(z)
0 1 u 0
= 0 0 1 2 + 0
0 0 0 1
y = Cz 1
100 2
(4.33)
where <j>(z) =  — 5zi — 4.823 — 0.2zf — 0.2z\  +  0.962x22 — 0.2zxz3 +  z2z3 — 0.2. If L  is
chosen as L (9) = 39 392 93 such that the eigenvalues of the matrix (A — L(1)C) 
are all located at —1, then, according to equation (4.31), the observer gain matrix 
L(9) can be obtained by:
L(9) = 0 ~ lL =
—2.8845#2 -  0.19230s 
30
-O.115502 +  0.19230s
(4.34)
Figure 4.4 and 4.5 present the synchronization errors for 0 =  3 and 0 =  10, with the
corresponding L = -31.1526 9.0000 4.1526 and L -480.75 30.00 180.75
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respectively. As the figures show, the trajectories of the systems (4.14) and (4.17) con­
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Figure 4.4: Synchronization errors of systems (4.14) and (4.17) for 9 = 3
T ime(sec)
Figure 4.5: Synchronization errors of systems (4.14) and (4.17) for 9 = 10
4.2 Application in Secure Communications
As briefly introduced in the previous chapter, the problem of synchronizing two 
chaotic systems has been throughly studied recently, mainly because of its potential
51
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
application to designing new chaotic cryptosystems for secure communications. For 
this application, on the transmitter side, the chaotic system with some preset pa­
rameters, as the key, is used to encrypt the private message signal, which is then 
transmitted through the public channel. The other chaotic system, on the receiver 
side, is used to retrieve the encrypted message signal via the synchronization of these 
two chaotic systems. Since chaotic systems are sensitively dependent on their initial 
conditions and parameters, it is believed that only the person, who knows exactly 
the key used in the transmitter, can design a synchronous receiver system to recover 
the message signal. Obviously, in the drive-response setup described above, the drive 
system can be considered as the transm itter and the response system can be regarded 
as the receiver, as illustrated in Figure 3.5.
Several methods concerning this m atter have been proposed in the literature. We 
shall discuss three different approaches called chaotic masking, chaotic modulation 




x(t) s ( t )
rh(t)
Chaotic transmitter Chaotic receiver
Figure 4.6: Chaotic signal masking cryptosystem
The most direct approach to communicating with a chaotic signal is called chaotic
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masking, which was proposed in (Pecora and Carroll 1990; Cuomo and Oppenheim 
1993). The basic idea that underlines this method is that the private message sig­
nal m(t) to be transmitted is added directly to the noise-like masking signal at the 
transmitter-end for the encryption purpose, then the overall signal is transm itted to 
the receiver over the public channel. At the receiver-end, the masking is removed via 
the synchronization of transmitter and receiver systems. This process is done by us­
ing the transmission signal as the driving signal to reconstruct the noise-like masking 
signal at the receiver system, and subtracting it from the received signal which finally 
recovers the message signal m(t)  (refer to Figure 4.6). In order for this scheme to 
work properly, the original message signal has to be sufficiently small with respect to 
the chaotic masking signal, so that it can be considered as a small perturbation in 
the transmission signal. Since it is found experimentally that the ability to synchro­
nize is robust, i.e., is not highly sensitive to perturbations in the transmission signal, 
implying that the synchronization can be done with the masked signal (Pecora and 
Carroll 1991).
By following the example of synchronization of Lorenz system in Section 4.1.1, 
we design a chaos masking secure communication system consisting of the transm it­
ter the same as system (4.5) and the receiver similar to the system (4.9), with x(t) 
replaced by s(t) as a driving signal. Although there are many possible variations, 
we consider a transmission signal of the form s(t) =  x(t) + m (t) where we assume 
that the power level of the message signal m(t) is significantly lower than tha t of the 
chaotic masking signal x(t), so that the synchronization between the transm itter and 
receiver can be guaranteed. As Figure 4.6 illustrates, once the receiver is synchro­
nized with the transmitter by the driving signal s(t), then the masking signal x(t) 
can be reconstructed, that is, x(t) =  x'(t). Consequently, the original information 
signal m(t) can be finally recovered as m(t) — s(t) — x'(t) —> m(t), with x(t) —> x'(t) 
as t  —► oo.
The performance of this secure communication system is demonstrated in Figure 
4.7 with a segment of a sound signal: “The good boy.” being transm itted through it.
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The figure shows the original sound signal m(t) and the recovered sound signal m(t). 
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Figure 4.7: Sound signal encryption and recovery with chaotic masking method: 
(a) original sound signal; (b) recovered sound signal; (c) transmission signal
4.2.2 Chaotic M odulation
The method of chaotic modulation proposed in (Wu and Chua 1993) and (Liao 
and Huang 1999) resembles the above approach, but adds more complexity and se­
curity to the transmission of the message signal. The suggested idea is that, at 
the transmitter, the original message signal is not only modulated with the chaotic 
signal by some specified operation, but also injected into the chaotic system. This 
means that the message signal can modify states of the transm itter system through 
an invertible procedure; thus, the generated chaotic signal inherently contains the 
information of the message signal. The receiver synchronizes with the transm itter 
via reconstruction of its state using the transmission signal. The message signal is
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recovered by applying the inverse modulation operation to the reconstructed state 
and the received signal. The main idea of this method is sketched in Figure 4.8.
Private message signal
m(t )
x(t)  1 s(t) x'(t) rh{t)
Chaotic transmitter Chaotic receiver
Figure 4.8: Chaotic signal modulation cryptosystem
We shall describe this method using the Lorenz system again, and consider a 
simple way to modulate the message signal m(t) with the chaotic signal x(t), that is, 
s(t) = m(t) + x(t).  This addition is then transm itted to the receiver; meanwhile it is 
also fed back into the transmitter system. Then, the transmitter for this scheme is 
given as follows:
x = —a(x — y)
y  =  — (x +  m(t))z + p(x + m(t)) — y  (4.35)
i  =  (x + m(t))y -  (3z.
Now consider the transmission signal as s(t) =  x(t) +  m(t), the receiver can be 
designed as:
x — —a(x  — y)
y -  - { x  +  m(t))z  +  p{x +  m (t)) -  y  (4.36)
£ =  (x + m(t))y -  @z.
For this chaotic modulation cryptosystem, it can be proven that the transm itter 
(4.35) can synchronize with the receiver (4.36), with the parameters a =  16, P = 4 and
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p =  44.8 (Wu and Chua 1993). Hence the original message signal can be retrieved by 
an inverse modulation operation, that is, m(t) =  s ( t )—x(t) —> m(t), with x(t) —► x(t) 
as t —► oo. Figure 4.9 shows the results of transmitting a continuous-time message 
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Figure 4.9: Transmission of message signals with the chaotic modulation method: 
(a) original message signal; (b) recovered message signal; (c) transmission signal
4.2.3 Chaotic Switching
In the method of chaotic masking and chaotic modulation, a continuous-time 
message signal was encrypted by a noise-like chaotic signal. Now, we present a  quite 
similar cryptosystem, introduced in (Parlitz et al. 1992), to safely transmit and 
receive a discrete-valued message signal, which is usually binary. The essence of this 
method is that two sets of parameter values are predefined at the transm itter system, 
while only one set of parameter values, which is the same as one of those two sets used 
in the transmitter, is preset at the receiver system. Then the transmitter switches
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parameters, so that they change to one of two predefined sets of values depending on 
whether a “1” or a “0” is being transmitted. At the receiver, one set of values will 
lead to a perfect synchronization, while another one will produce a synchronization 
error between the received driving signal and the receiver’s generated chaotic signal. 
By low pass filtering the synchronization error signal and applying a threshold test 
to the low pass filtered signal, the binary message signal can be retrieved successfully 
(Cuomo and Oppenheim 1993). This process is shown in Figure 4.10.










Figure 4.10: Chaotic signal switching system
To illustrate the performance of this scheme, we take a square wave as the binary 
message signal shown in Figure 4.11(a), which produces a variation in the parameter 
(3 of the transmitter, given by system (4.5), with zero-bit and one-bit parameters 
corresponding to /?(0) =  4 and (3(1) =  4.4, respectively, while, at the receiver system 
which is also given by system (4.5), the value of the parameter (3 is kept as (3 — 4 
for all the time. Figure 4.11(b) shows the synchronization error signal. It is obvious 
that the parameter switching produces significant synchronization error during a “1” 
transmission and a very small error during a “0” transmission. Figure 4.11(c) shows 
the synchronization error signal filtered by a low-pass filter, designed as:
10~8(0.1216 +  0.36482i +  0.364822 +  0.1216*3)
H(z) = (4.37)
1 -  2.99572i +  2.991522 -  0.995723 
Figure 4.11(d) shows that the square-wave can be finally recovered by applying a
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threshold test2 to the filtered synchronization error signal.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
/ w  Mo 001
- 0.01
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
time(sec)
Figure 4.11: Discrete signal encryption and recovery with chaotic switching method: 
(a) digital information signal; (b)synchronization error power; (c) low 
pass filtered signal; (d) recovered digital signal.
2In this case, we set the threshold value as 0.008. For all the value of filtered synchronization 
error signal lesser than the threshold value, it is set as 0, otherwise it is set as 1.
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Chapter 5
N ew  Secure Com m unication  
System
Achieving easy recovery by the receiver but difficult detection by any third party 
of a message signal is always the most important issue in secure communications. 
As seen from the applications of chaos synchronization to secure communications 
discussed in the former chapter, the message signal is first modulated by a chaotic 
carrier signal for the encryption purpose and then transmitted to the receiver, while 
the receiver has to recover the message signal from the incoming transmission sig­
nal, via the synchronization of the transmitter and the receiver system. Since haotic 
systems are extremely dependent on their initial conditions and parameter settings, 
the asymptotic synchronization of the transmitter and the receiver is inevitable for 
the scheme, which not only guarantees a message signal being successfully recovered 
by the receiver, but also prevents it from being read during the transmission process 
by any unauthorized party. This means that the most important aspect of chaos 
synchronization is its security.
Commonly, in order to achieve the synchronization, some typical ways such as the 
drive-response mechanism, observer-based approach, etc., which have been discussed 
in detail in the former chapter are usually utilized. However, for several of these 
methods, the security of the synchronization is quite questionable as discussed in the
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following section. This chapter formalizes the concept of secure synchronization of 
chaotic systems and discusses an approach to achieve the secure synchronization of 
chaotic systems. A new secure communication system, based on the secure synchro­
nization, is also developed and investigated.
5.1 Secure Synchronization
Generally, in applications of chaos synchronization to secure communications, 
the parameter settings of the drive system are considered as the secret “key” for the 
encryption of message signals, and it is believed that without precise knowledge of 
this secret “key” , used in the drive system, it is very difficult to design a correspond­
ing response system synchronized with the drive system to decrypt the encrypted 
message signals. However, from a control theory viewpoint, the problem of having 
unknown parameters in the system model can be solved by using certain techniques 
such as the adaptive control or robust control. For example, an adaptive observer 
usually includes an estimation subsystem for the unknown parameters, and, by using 
some adaptation algorithms, the unknown parameters can be estimated accurately. 
This means that the adaptive or robust control method may be considered for pos­
sible attacks against secure communication and encryption schemes. By using these 
techniques, an intruder might design a false receiver synchronized with the transm it­
ter to recover the message signals without knowing the secrete “key” . This problem, 
however, was mostly neglected when chaotic secure communication schemes were de­
veloped in the past. To demonstrate this problem, we shall introduce an adaptive 
synchronization scheme originally studied in (Fradkov et al. 1999) and (Liao and 
Tsai 2000), which employs the adaptive control technique for the synchronization of 
chaotic systems with unknown parameters, so that it is not suitable for the applica­
tion to secure communications.
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5.1.1 Example of Insecure Synchronization
Consider the following nonlinear chaotic system with the unknown constant pa­
rameters n
x = A x  + BfiT(f){y)
(5.1)
y =  CTx
where x  G Mn is the state, and y G R. is the scalar output signal used as the syn­
chronizing signal for the observer. The matrix A  G RnXn, B  G Rnxiand C e t "  are 
constants. Moreover, 4>(x) is (Z x k) matrix with uniformly Lipschitz entries, /x 6 Rfc 
is the constant parameter vector which may be unknown as the secret key.
Assume that the pair (CT, A) is observable. Then, on the basis of state observer 
design approach discussed before, an adaptive-observer-based synchronization system 
corresponding to the drive system (5.1) can be designed as follows:
x  =  Ax  +  BfiT(f)(y) +  L(y  — CTx) (5.2)
where y is the received transmission signal and L 6 1 "  is the observer gain vector 
which is chosen fittingly such that (A — LC T) is an exponentially stable matrix, which 
is possible since the pair (CT , A) is assumed to be observable. Moreover, /i G Rfc 
represents the adjustable parameters used to estimate the unknown parameters in the 
drive system, which are updated according to the following adaptation algorithm:
fr =  <l>(.y)(y-y)- (5-3)
Furthermore, we assume that there exists a strictly positive real (SPR) transfer func­
tion, W (s) =  CT(s i  — {A — LCt ))~xB , with an appropriately chosen L. In light of the
well-known Kalman-Yakubovich Lemma (Ioannou and Sun 1996), this strict positive 
realness of W(s) guarantees that there exist symmetric and positive matrices P  and 
Q satisfying the following equations
(A -  LCT)TP  +  P (A  -  L C 1) =  - Q
P B  = C. (5.4)
61
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Then, we have the following proposition:
P ro p o sitio n  5.1.1 (Liao an d  T sai 2000). . For the given drive system (5.1), the 
designed adaptive-observer-based response system (5.2) associated with the adaptation 
algorithm (5.3) can globally asymptotically synchronize with the drive system, i.e., 
||x(i) — x(t)|| —> 0 as t —> 0 for all initial conditions.
Proof. First of all, we define the state error for the system (5.1) and (5.2) as e =  x —x, 
and then, under the adaptation algorithm (5.3), the resulting error dynamics can be 
characterized as follows:
e = (A —LC T)e + B(/j, — jf)T(f)(y). (5.5)
We now choose the Lyapunov function as
V  — eTPe  +  (p -  fi)T{p -  p.). (5.6)
Taking the time derivative of V  along the trajectories of the resulting error dynamical 
system (5.5) leads to
V  = eTPe +  eTPe +  2 (p — p)T(—p)
= ((.A - L C T)e + B { p - f i ) T4>{y))TPe
+eTP((A  -  LCT)e +  B(p, -  fx)T(j>{y)) +  2(p -  fi)T{-cp{y)CTe)
-  eT(A -  LCT)TPe + (f(y)T(p -  fi)BTPe  (5.7)
+eTP((A  — LCT)e + eTP B (p  — p,)<f>(y)) — 2(p — jx)T<p(y)CTe 
= eT((A -  LC t )t P  +  P (A  -  LC T))e +  (f{y)T{p -  fi)BTPe  
+eTP B (p  -  p.)4>(y) -  2 ( / j , -  p)T4>{y)TCTe.
By using equation (5.4), it yields
V  =  —eTQe. (5.8)
Since V  is a positive and decrescent function and V  is negative semidefinite, by 
following the LaSalle Principle (Khalil 2002), we can conclude that e(t) —► 0 as
62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
t —> oo, which means that the designed adaptive-observer-based receiver (5.2) can 
synchronize with the given drive system (5.1).
Consider as an example of chaotic synchronization system where both drive and 
response systems are the well-known Chua’s chaotic system. The drive system in 
dimensionless form is given by (2.12) and it can be written in the form (5.1) as 
follows:
x = A x  + B p T(p(y)
-1 0 10 0 1
= 1 - 1  1 x  + 0 (—10by -  5(a -  6)(| y +  1 | -  | y -  1 Q)
0 -15 0 0
y =  CTx - 1 0 0 x = Xi
(5.9)
— 105 —5 (a — b)where <f>(y) = y \ y +  1 | -  | y -  1 | , and pT =  ^  
which is assumed to be a priori unknown motivating the use of an adaptation for the 
response system design. It can be easily verified that the pair (CT A) is observable, 
which means that the response system can be designed according to the above results, 
modeled as
x  =  A x  +  B p T(f)(y) +  L(y -  y)
-1 0 10 0 1
1 - 1 1 x  + 0 ( A l y +  M 2 ( |  y + 1 1 -  1 y - 1 | ) )  +  L(y -  y)
0 -15 0 0
I! =  CTx  = 1 0 0 x  = Xx
(5.10)
where p T - M l  M2 represent the adjustable parameters used to estimate unknown 
parameters p\ and p2 , which are updated according to the adaptation algorithm (5.3), 
that is,
M i  =  ( y - y ) y
M 2  =  ( y - y ) ( \ y  +  l  \ -  \ y  -  1 | ) .
(5.11)
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-8.9615 1.6921 0.5769 so that theIt can be found that, if L is chosen as L = 
matrix (A  — LCT) is stable with the eigenvalues —0.9737 and —0.5324± j 4 .6518, then 
we can get the strict positive real transfer function
s2 +  s +  15
" W  =  C T ( S I  ~  ( A  ~  L C T ) ) ~ ' B  =  T T I o i ® *  +  22.9595s +  21.3461' 
This means that the following symmetric and positive-definite matrices
P
(5.12)
0.5107 0.2553 0.0046 1 0 0
0.2553 7.5173 -0.2977 ,Q = 0 1 0
-0.0046 -0.2977 0.5256 0 0 1
(5.13)
can be obtained according to equation (5.4).
Moreover, in the numerical simulation, the values of system’s parameter, the 
secret “Key”, are chosen as a =  —1.28 and b =  —0.69, implying that /q =  6.9 and 
H2 =  2.95. Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the state of the designed adaptive observer
(5.10) can converge to that of the given drive system (5.9), although some of system’s 
parameters are unknown for the observer system. Figure 5.2 shows the unknown 
parameters fix and fi2, and the estimated parameters fix and fi2, respectively. Clearly, 
in this approach, although some parameters of the drive system are unknown, they 
can still be estimated by this adaptive-observer-based approach. Consequently, it is 
not secure to be used in secure communications applications.
5.1.2 Concept of Secure Synchronization
Certainly it is undesirable if a synchronization scheme, which might be used for 
secure communications, is known to be vulnerable to simple attacks. In view of this, 
here we present the concept of secure synchronization, with respect to adaptive and 
robust control schemes (Celikovsky and Chen 2005). We begin with re-defining the 
definition of the synchronization of chaotic systems, formulated in control theoretic 
terms.
Consider the nonlinear chaotic system ( 2 . 1 1 )  with a parameter vector / i ,  which
64
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Figure 5.2: The unknown parameters and the estimated parameters
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is re-written as follows:
x = f ( x , t ,p ) ,
where x e l "  and p  6 Mm.
(514)
Definition 5.1.1. System (5.14) *5 sa^d t° achieve a synchronization of a solution 
x( t) , t  > t0, i f  there exists an auxiliary output, y =  y(x) € W ,p  < n, such that with 
this output the system (5.14) has the following smooth asymptotic observer for the 
solution x(t), t >  to-'
x = f (x ,  t, p) +  cp(y(x),y(x), x , p), (5.15)
where x, x € Mn and p  € Mm.
Definition 5.1.2. The synchronization is said to be antiadaptive secure with re­
spect to the parameter p, i f  there does not exist any adaptive observer of the form  
(5.15) with p — p, p  € Mm, which can be obtained from the following adaptation 
algorithm:
p = ip(p1y (x ) ,y (x ) ,x ,t ) .  (5.16)
D efinition 5.1.3. The synchronization is said to be antirobust secure with respect 
to the parameter p, if there exists a positive constant K  such that for any p, p  from
a given compact set and for any solution of the system (5.14) with p  =  p and the
observer (5.15) with p  = p, it holds that
\im \\x(t) — x(t)\\ > K (p  — p). (5-17)
t—>oo
Then the secure synchronization is defined as the one that is both antiadap­
tive secure and antirobust secure.
Obviously, for any synchronization scheme, the antiadaptive secure implies that, 
if the parameter p  is considered as the secret key, there should be no way that an 
intruder could obtain it by using the adaptive-observer design technique. Moreover, 
the antirobust secure means that, for any synchronization method employing an esti­
mated key parameter, a big enough inaccuracy of the parameters estimation should
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cause big enough synchronization error. Therefore, both antiadaptive and antirobust 
security properties of the synchronization scheme are crucial for resisting potential 
attacks, since they guarantee that only the person who knows exactly the secret key 
can design an observer to construct the synchronization system.
Notice that although the secure synchronization is defined very broadly and there­
fore it seems difficult to verify, the intention here is to underline the fact that, the 
synchronization of chaotic systems for secure communications should offer a higher 
level of security to prevent the secure communication system from being vulnerable to 
simple attacks. Baaed on this consideration, the adaptive-observer-based approach to 
synchronize the well-known Chua’s system with some unknown parameters presented 
by Proposition 5.1.1 is not antiadaptive secure. In fact, it has been shown that the 
unknown key parameters used in the drive system were estimated successfully by this 
adaptive-observer approach (see Figure 5.2). Moreover, the case of synchronization 
problem of a typical class of chaotic systems having the so-called Brunowsky canon­
ical form, which is discussed in Section 4.1.2, can be considered as the one which is 
not antirobust secure. The reason is given by the following Proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  5.1.2 (A lvarez-R am irez  e t  al. 2002). Suppose that system (5.14) 
and its synchronizing output y(x) have the form




0  1 0  . . .  0 r  -\
0
0  0  1 . . .  0
, B  =
0
0  0  0  . . .  1
1
0  0  0  . . .  0
where f ( x ,  p) is Lipschitz in x, x  is bounded, and p  stays within a compact set. Then 
the system (5.18) allows synchronization that is not antirobust secure. Namely, the
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x = A x  +  B f ( x ,  p) + L(y — Cx)
where p is some nominal value of the unknown parameter p and L = Q Q2 
has the property that for any positive constant e, there exists a 9(e) >  0, such that 
lim^oo ||x(t) -  x(t) || —> 0.
Proof. Consider the 0-scaled synchronization error for the systems (5.18) and (5.19) as 
e =  A (x—x), where A =  diag(9n~1, 9n~2,..., 1), and then the resulting synchronization 
error dynamics can be characterized as follows:
F(9) =
9F( l ) e +  0 . . .  
- 9  1 0 ...
- 9 2 0 1 0
- 93 0 0 ' - .
-9n~l 0 0 . .
- 9 n 0 0 . .
P(t)
0 0 





where p(t) =  f ( x ,  fi) — f(x ,  p) is a certain bounded function, since f ( x ,  p) is Lipschitz, 
implying that ||p(f)|| <  ol\ \x  — x ||, a  > 0 for all t > 0. It is easy to verify that the 
matrix F ( l)  is Hurwitz. This means that there exists a symmetric positive definite 
matrix P  such that the equation
F(1)t P  + P t F(1) = - I (5.21)
is satisfied.
We now choose the Lyapunov function as V  = eTPe  , and then the time derivative 
of V  along the solution of (5.20) is given by
V  =  —#||e||2 +  2 jo .
<  — #||e||2 +  2 a\\x — x\
< —̂ ||e ||2 +  2o:||P ||||e||2
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From equation (5.22), it can be seen that for any positive constant a, a positive 
constant 9 can be found such that V  < 0, which implies that
lim ||x(t) — £(£)|| —► 0. (5.23)
t — ►OO
■
From Proposition 5.1.2, it is obvious that this synchronization approach has the 
robustness property, which means that it is not highly sensitive to the mismatch of 
parameters used in the drive and response systems. This is against the definition of 
secure synchronization presented above; therefore, it should not be used for secure 
communications. So, based on the above analysis, we may state that a secure syn­
chronization scheme should not be based on typical drive-response techniques and 
should not use well-classified chaotic systems. On the contrary, a good candidate 
might be a system that admits an observer, but at the same time has some important 
components that are detectable but not observable.
5.1.3 Secure Synchronization Scheme
The generalized Lorenz system (GLS) and its transformation form, the so-called 
generalized Lorenz canonical form, have been introduced in Chapter 2. Since it 
represents a very general class of chaotic systems with only one parameter, we shall use 
it to design a synchronization system based on the concept of secure synchronization.
Now, by letting
Zl ~  2̂ 
X1Z2 — X2Z1




where rj Vi  V2 % , the system (2.21) can be transformed into the following
observer canonical form (Celikovsky and Chen 2005):
rj = Ar) + F{q,y) (5.25)
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II 1 0 (Ai +  A2)t7i
where A 0 0 0 and F(rj, y) = -A i A27?i -  (Ai -  A2)t7i773 -  0.5(k +  l)(??i)3
0 0 ^3 K(K)(m y
with K ( k ) = ^ ( ' t +21̂ i -_2^ -  . ?Az.
The reason to transform the system (2.21) into the form (5.25), here, is to remove 
the cross term z2[z\ — z2) in the system (2.21); meanwhile to keep the term K(K)rjf in 
the system (5.25), which depends only on the component % =  z\ — z2. This property 
is crucial for the synchronization scheme design to be presented later on.
We now consider the system (5.25) with its bounded trajectory r)(t), t  > t0 as 
the drive system and the first state rft is chosen as the driving signal to drive a 
response system in order to achieve the synchronization. Then the drive system can 
be expressed as follows
f] =  Arj +  F(r), y)
V = CTrj
(5.26)
where CT 1 0 0 Notice that, for the drive system (5.26), the pair (C7\  A) 
is not observable but detectable, which implies the possibility to design a response 
system as an observer to synchronize the system (5.26). Now we consider the following 
system as the response one:
77 =  Afj + F{fj,y) + L(ffi - t][)
0 1 0 (Ai +  \ 2)Vi h
0 0 0 77+ -X iX 2r}[ -  (Ai -  X2)rj[fi3 -  0.5(/c+ l ) ^ ) 3 + h
0 0 A3 K ( kM ) * 0
(Vi ~  rfx)
(5.27)
where rj = , and L — with Z12 < 0. In addition, r}[ isl\ l2 0
the input driving signal, which may be biased by the noise during the propagation 
procedure. Thus, by assuming ||t7i (t) —rj[ (t ) || <  s, where e is a small positive constant, 
the following theorem can be obtained.
T h eo rem  5.1.1 (C elikovsky a n d  C h en  2005). Consider a drive system given by
(5.26) and an observer-based response system given by (5.27). It holds exponentially
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in time that
lim \\r){t) -  77(f))|| < Ds  (5.28)t—► OO
where D is some positive constant. Particularly, i f  rft = r)[, the response system
(5.27) globally asymptotically synchronizes the drive system (5.26), i.e.,
t —>oo
(5.29)
Proof. By allowing the state error 77 =  
be written as follows:
Vi  V2 Vs = rj — fj, the error dynamics can
Vi = V i~  Vi
— ( A x  +  ^ 2 ) ^ 1  +  ^ 2  ~  I1V1 ~  V2 ~  ( A i  +  A 2  —  h ) r ] i
— h(Vi ~  Vi) +  62 ~  62 +  (Ai +  A2 — h){T]i — rff) 
=  Zi?7i + fj2 +  (Ai +  A2 — h)(r)i — rj[)
(5.30)
V2 =  V 2 - V 2
= -X iX 2rji -  (Ai -  X2)'nir}3 -  0.5(« +  l)r]f
—I2V1 +  (A1A2 +  k)Vi +  (Ai — Xfjri^fjz +  0.5(/c +  l)(?7i)3 
=  h(vi ~  Vi) ~  (Xi -  X2)r][(r]3 -  rjs)
+(-A iA 2 ~ h ~  (Ax -  A2)t73 -  0.5(ac +  l)(r}f +  77? (^?i)2 +  iv[)2))(Vi ~  v[)
=  k m  + 4> ( t ) m  +  pit) im -  v[)
(5.31)
where 0 (f) =  -(A : -  A2)77i and ( p{ t )  =  (-AiA2 - l 2 ~  (Ax -  A2)773 -  0.5(« +  1 )(rfi +
V i i v ' i ) 2 +  ( V i ) 2 ) ) -  Since trajectories 7 7 ( f )  are bounded, f i t )  and p { t )  are bounded
functions.
% =  m  - f j 3
=  A 3 ( t 7 3  —  7) 3 )  +  —  ( r j f ) 2 )
=  A3773 +  K («) (771 +  7/J (771 -  77j)
=  A 3 7 7 3  +  V ’W ( ? 7x -  V i )
(5.32)
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where ip(t) =  K { k)(t}\ +  rj[) is also a bounded function.
Obviously, by solving equation (5.32), it is easy show that
i%(t) = eX3% (0) + eXst [  e~X3T7p(r)(rji(r) -  r̂ /1(r))d
Jo
Assume ||t̂ (£)|| <  î> <̂ i > 0- Then we can get
ll%WII =  ||eA3b)3(0) +  eX3t f* e -A3T̂ (r)(r]i(r) -  77i(r))d r  ||
(5.33)
1 (r) -  71[{r))\ \dT=  e A3t||773(0)|| +  eAst /q  e A3r||^ (r
< eA3t||?73(0)|| +  die eXst f* e~XzTdr
< eXst11773(0)|| +  Gh£eA3t( - - ^ ) ( e -A3t -  1)
<  eA3t||773(0)|| -  ^  ^  eX3t.
Clearly, since A3 < 0, di > 0 and £ > 0 we can obtain
lim \ \ U m  <  eA3t||773(0)|| -  ^  +  y ^ e A3t <  < D xe
t - *  00 a 3 a 3 a 3
(5.34)
(5.35)
where Di =  — is a positive constant.Aq
Now, by defining 77 
can have




h  1 0
1.....- 
"■1<N+CO
77 + 7 ) 3  +
I2 0 <p(t)
(m -  v 'i)
(5.36)
Sr] + <j>(t)fjs +  771 -  r][).
h  1 0 Ai +  A2 — l\
, <£(*) = and (pit) =
I2 0 0(f)_ <p{t)
where S  =
Hurwitz matrix, and <p(t) and (p{t) are also bounded functions. 
Therefore, by solving (5.36), we can have:
fj(t) = estfj(0) + est J* e~ST4>{r)7j3(r)dr  
+eSt fo e~ST<p(r )(Vi(T) ~  17i(T))dr.
Obviously, S  is a
(5.37)
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Similarly, assume ||<£(f)|| <  d2 and \\<p ||<  d3, where d2, d3 are positive constants. 
Then we can get:
II^WII =  l|eStH 11̂ (0)11 +  l|es t || fo II e“5T||||0(r)||||r?3(T)||dr 
+l|e5t||/o  II e‘ 5T||||(p(r)||||(r?i(r) - ^ ( r ) ) | |d r  
< l|e54||||T7(0)|| + d 2 || eSt| | /„* || e -5T||||7)3(T)||dT (5.38)
+d3e || e^H/o || e_5r||dr
Since the matrix S  is Hurwitz, there exist two positive constants m  > 1 and a > 0 
such that ||e5t|| <  me~at for all t > 0. Thus, the following inequality:
||r](f)|| <  m e  Q<||r?(0)|| + d 2m f * e  a(t T)||7)3(r) ||d r  + d3e m f* e  Q(t TW  (5.39)
is satisfied for all t > 0.
Notice that, based on equation (5.33) and (5.35), the second part of the right 
hand side of (5.39) can be written as
d2m e - at J^eaT\\fj3(r)\\dT 
< d2m e~ at eaT(eXsT\\fj3(0)\\ + Die — D ieeXzT)dr
< d2m e~ at /o (e ^ +A3̂ T||773(0)|| +  D ieeaT — D\S e^a+Xz T̂)dT
< d2m e~ at( 1 (e(Q+A»>f - 1 )  +  ^ f ( e at- l )  -  - ^ - ( e ^ + ^ - l ) )  ^ ' 40)GL I A3 GL I A3
d2m  1| 7)3(0)11 _ d2m  |1 7)3(0) || —at 1 d2mDi£    d2TnD-[£ —at
a  A3 a  -f- A3 ct
_ d 2mD1s \ 3t , d2mD ie -at 
a + \ 3 e a + A3 '
Clearly, with A3 < 0 and a > 0, and as t —> 00, the following inequality can be 
obtained




d3em f ‘ e “n- 7'dT =  _  'M dli (5.42)
Obviously, d:\im f '  e 1,11 r-dr tends to as t —> oo.
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where D 2 = d2mDi+ d3m is a positive constant. 
This completes the proof.
In the following numerical simulation, Ax =  8, A2 =  —16, A3 =  —2, k =  0, 
lx =  —8 and l2 = —12 was chosen to construct the secure synchronization system, 
while the initial error between the drive system (5.26) and the observer-based system
(5.27) was set quite large. In addition, we only considered the case of 771 (t) = 
that means there was no noise or bias involved in the driving signal rji. Figure 5.3 
shows the chaotic behaviour of the drive system (5.26) in three-dimension and in 771-773 
plane. Figure 5.4 demonstrates that the synchronization errors of the system (5.26) 
and (5.27) can converge to zero exponentially.
m
(a) The oscillator in three dimension (b) The oscillator in 771-% plane
Figure 5.3: Chaotic behaviour of the drive system (5.26)
We now analyze the security property of the synchronization scheme. First of 
all, we only consider the parameter k in the drive system (5.26) as the secret key. 
According to the definition of secure synchronization, it is supposed that with a 
mismatched key parameter k used in the “fake” response system, it is very difficult for 
an intruder to achieve the synchronization. This refers to the property of antirobust 
secure. The effect of a mismatch in the key parameter k is given in the following
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10 15 20 25
Time{sec)
Figure 5.4: Synchronization of the drive system and the observer-based
response system
proposition.
P ro p o sitio n  5.1.3 (Celikovsky an d  C hen  2005). Consider the drive system a 
key -parameter k =  Kd, and the observer-based response system with an unbiased input, 
i.e., r)[ =  Tji and a mismatched key parameter k =  kt . Then for sufficiently small 
I Kd — Kr\, we have
lim \\r]i(t) -77i(i))|| < A (h ,fe)|«dt-+oo (5.44)
where, for i =  1,2, Di(li,l2) > 0 are some parameters converging to zero under the 
condition li ±  y /lf  + 4l2 —» —oo , while D${li, l2) > 0 is the parameter which does not 
depend on l^2.
l  T
Proof. Defining the state error rj = 
written as follows:
Vi = h v  i +  m
171 172 m =  r) — fj, the error dynamics can be
= I2V1 ~  (Ai -  A2)7?i773 +  0.5(«y -  Kd)r]l
V3 =  A37)3 + K{Kd -  Krffil 
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where ip(t) =  r[{{t) is obviously a bounded function.
Analogous to the previous proof procedure, solving equation (5.47) yields
773(f) =  eX3tfj3(0) + K(Kd -  nr)eX3t [  e_A3r V'(r)dr. (5.48)
Jo
And finally we can end up with
lim \\rto(t)\\ < D z\K(Kd -  Kr)|t—>00
where D 3 is a positive constant depending on the parameter A3.
iT
(5.49)
Similarly, by defining 77 
we can have
Vi V2 , and according to equation (5.45) and (5.46),
h  1 0
77 = 77 +
k  0 1 p (
p 1 V to cf l 
,,
fj3 +  («d -  Kr)
0
O.577? (5.50)
=  S'T] + <p(t)fj3 + (Kd -  Kr)(p(t)
where S  = h  1 
k  0
0
-(A i -  A2)77i
and cp(t) =
0.577?
Hurwitz matrix, implying that there exists two positive constan
Obviously, S' is a 
ts m  > 1 and a  >  0
such that ||e5t|| <  m  e~at for all t > 0. Moreover, 0(f) and <p(t) are bounded functions, 
i.e., ||0 (f)|| <  ai and ||y?(f)|| <  a2 with ai > 0, a2 > 0.
Therefore, by solving (5.50), we can have:
M t)\\  = ||e5t||||77(0)|| +  ||e5t|| f* || e -5T||||0 (r) ||||^3(r) ||d r
+ | K d - K r | | | e 5 t | | / (J || - S t  I M r)\\d r
< He1541|||77(0)jj +  ax||e5t|| J* ||e 5 r||||773(r) ||d r
r+ a 2|Kd -  KrlUe54!!/,, ||e 5 r||d 
< m e~ at\\fi(0)\\ + a im  f*  e_a(t_r)||^3(r) ||d  
+ a , 2 m \ K d — K r  | f *  e ~ a ^ ~ T^ d T
(5.51)
Based on equation (5.49) and (5.51), we can finally get:
lim ||77(t)|| <  — ( - ^ 3Ql +  a2m)\Kd -  kt \ < D\Kd -  Kr \ (5.52)t-*oo a  A3
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where D — a* +  02m), whose value is dependent on the matrix S. Since
S  — h  l"1
h  0
, it can be proved that, if l\ ±  \ / l j  + 4Z2 —► — 0 0  then
lim ||7](t)|| =  0. (5.53)t—*oo
Through the above mathematical analysis, it is clear that, due to the special 
structure of the system used for the secure synchronization purpose, the third state 
is detectable but not observable, which leads to the third component of the error 
dynamics to be independent of the gains l\ and 1%. This means that D 12  can be made 
sufficiently small by choosing a large observer gain, li and I2, thereby making the 
first two components of synchronization errors converge to a sufficiently small value. 
However, the third component of the error dynamics only dependents on the mismatch 
of the parameter, which implies that the synchronization errors will stay large if there 
exists a mismatch of the parameter. Hence, using a mismatched “Key” , At , in a 
“fake” synchronization system may lead to a signal which is qualitatively similar to 
the correct one, but it will not help much the intruder to recover the hidden message 
signal by using this fake synchronization system. Therefore, the antirobust secure 
can be realized. On the other hand, the adaptive-observer-based scheme presented 
in Proposition 5.1.1 can not be used for this case, because, by considering CT =  
1 0 0 in system (5.26) and equation (5.4) with P  being nonsingular, it leads to 
the rank of B  to be equal to one. This means that it is not possible to design an 
adaptive-observer to estimate the values of the key parameter k  in the given drive 
system (5.26). Moreover, it is noticeable that there is a singularity for 771 =  0 which 
can prevent the observer canonical form (5.26) from being further transformed into an 
observability form, where the latter enables the use of Proposition 5.1.1 or Proposition
5.1.2 with B having rank equal to one. So, clearly, the antiadaptive secure property 
can also be obtained for this approach.
Figure 5.5 shows the simulation result of synchronizing the systems (5.26) and
77
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Figure 5.5: “Fake” synchronization of the system (5.26) and (5.27) 
with unmatched key parameter k
(5.27), by using a slightly different parameter k, namely, Kd =  0 in the drive system
(5.26) and Kd =  0.01 in the response system (5.27). Other data are the same as those 
used in the previous simulations. As the figure shows, even a slight difference in the 
value of the parameter k can cause a big synchronization error.
5.2 A New Secure Communication System
In previous sections, we discussed some insecure synchronization schemes, which 
make secure communication systems based on these synchronization schemes can not 
be applied to transmitting message signals that request a high level of security. The 
synchronization scheme based on the generalized Lorenz system discussed in Section
5.1.3 has antiadaptive secure and antirobust secure properties, which means that we 
can design a new secure communication system based on this synchronization scheme 
to offer high security and privacy for the transmission of messages.
In the following, the observer-based secure synchronization scheme, illustrated 
above, is applied to designing a new chaotic secure communication system. Since the 
security property is the most crucial aspect for secure communication systems, we
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shall construct the cryptosystem based on the chaotic modulation method which has 
been discussed in detail in Chapter 4.




Figure 5.6: Block diagram of the chaotic secure communication system
Figure 5.6 shows the block diagram of the proposed cryptosystem, consist­
ing of an encrypter module (Transmitter), a public communication channel and a 
decrypter module (Receiver). As the figure shows, the transm itter system con­
sists of a chaotic system and an encryption scheme. The secret “Key”, shown in 
Figure 5.6 is used to set the values of parameters of the chaotic system, namely, 
K ey  =  {«;, Ai, A2, A3}. The chaotic system is used to generate two key signals, ki(t) 
and k,2{t). The first key signal, ki(t), is one state variable of the chaotic system, which 
should be utilized by the encryption scheme to pre-encrypt the message signal p(t). 
Then, the pre-encrypted signal, E(t), is added to the second key signal, /c2(f), which 
is another state variable of the chaotic system, for the further encryption. The sum is 
then transmitted to the receiver system through the public channel; meanwhile, it is 
also fed back to the chaotic system at the transm itter end. For the receiver system, 
same as the transmitter counterpart, it also consists of a chaotic system and a decryp­
tion scheme. By using exactly the same “Key” for the chaotic system parameters,
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Encryption
scheme















Figure 5.7: Chaotic behaviour of system (5.54).
the synchronization between the transm itter and the receiver can be achieved. Thus, 
two key signals, Aq(f) and k2(t), precisely the same as those used by the transm itter 
system can be reconstructed, using a synchronization scheme. Hence, the decryption 
scheme can be employed to finally recover the message signal p(t).
The chaotic system used in the transmitter is described by equation (5.26) with 
a slight modification1 and represented as follows:
V =
V
0 1 0 (Ai +  A 2)y(t)
0 0 0 77 + -AiA2?/(f) -- (Ai -  \ 2)r]3y(t) -  0.5(k +  l)(y(f))3




where E(t) e l  is the pre-encrypted signal outputted from the encryption scheme
and L I ■ I L2 0 is a gain vector. Moreover, we consider 771(f) as the key signal, 
k2(t). Then, the sum of k2(t) and the pre-encrypted signal E(t), namely, y(t) € M, is 
considered as the chaotic transmission signal, which drives the chaotic system at the
1Here, in order to design the receiver system properly, we modify the system (5.26) by adding 
the term LE( t ) .  Moreover, with an appropriately chosen parameters, the ratio of the value of the 
modification part, L E ( t ), to the value of state variables can be made quite small, for instance, 
0.001. Hence, we would consider it as a kind of external noise, which would not influence dynamical 
properties of the system, implying that system (5.54) can still present a chaotic behavior, as shown 
in Figure 5.7.
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receiver end. For the encryption scheme, since the third component of state variables 
of the chaotic system, r)3, is only detectable but unobservable, we consider it as the 
other key signal, ki(t). This should further increase the security level of the proposed 
cryptosystem. Then, the message signal can be pre-encrypted by means of an n-shift 
cipher introduced in (Yang et al. 1997), which can be depicted as:
E(t) = / ( . .  J ( f (p(t),ki{t)), k i ( t ) ) , fci(t))  ̂ (5.55)
n  n
where /  is a nonlinear function given by:
f ( x , k )
(x + k) + 2h, —2h < (x + k) < —h
(x + k), —h < ( x  + k ) < h  (5.56)
(x + k) — 2h, h < (x + k) < 2 h
where h is some constant parameter chosen in such a way that x(t) and k(t) lie within 
(—h. h). This function is shown in Figure (5.8).
f ( x ,  k)
-2h
(x +  k)
Figure 5.8: Nonlinear function used in continuous shift cipher
In the n-shift cipher, the key signal ki  (t ) is used n  times to encrypt the message 
signal. Since the pre-encrypted signal is a function of p(t) and ki(t),  and since the 
pre-encrypted signal is then further modulated with another set of key signals, that 
is k2(t), it hides both the dynamical and the statistical characteristics of both p(t) 
and ki(t).
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0 1 0 (Ai +  A2)y(f)
fj = 0 0 0 77 + -AiA2y(f) -- (Ax -  A2)7?32/(f) -  0.5(k +  l)(y (f))3
0 0 A3 E(^)(y( t ) )2
Similarly, the synchronizing chaotic system at the receiver end can be constructed 
as follows:
+ L(y ( t ) - t i i )
(5.57)
where y  is the received signal and L is the gain vector the same as that used in the 
transm itter system.
Then, it is believed that the synchronization can only be achieved with the use of 
the same “Key” at both transm itter and receiver sides. Hence, the key signals can be 
re-generated, namely, fci(f) —> fci(f) and /c2(f) —> fc2(f) as f tends to infinity. Finally, 
the corresponding decryption scheme can be expressed as follows:
P(t) =  /(■■• -fci(f)), —k \ (f)),. . . ,  - k i ( t ) ) (5.58)
where E(t) = y ( t ) — fci(f).
Then we have the following theorem:
Theorem  5.2.1. Suppose a message signal, p(t), is transmitted through a communi­
cation system consisting of a transmitter system with the chaotic system (5.54) and 
the encryption scheme (5.55), and a receiver system with the chaotic system (5.57) 
and the encryption scheme (5.58). Using the same “Key" in both transmitter and 
receiver system a global synchronization between the transmitter and the receiver sys­
tem can be achieved and the message signal, p(t), can be completely recovered at the 
receiver side.
Proof. Defining the synchronization error 77(f) =  77(f) —77(f), where fj = vi m  773
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y i e l d s
Oi(0 = Vi(t) -  mi*)
=  +  (Ai +  A2)(t7i(0 +  £ (0 )  +  L iE( t )
—772(0 ~  (Ai +  A2)(t7i(0 +  E(t)) — L i(771(0 +  E(t)  — 771 (0) (5.59)
=  —Li(r]i(t) -  771 (0) +  772O) -  772(0 
=  - L i  771(0 + 772W 
O2W =  ^ (O  “  772(0 
=  (—AxA2 — (Ai — A2)773 (0) (771 (0 +  £ (0 )
-0 .5 (k  +  1) (771 (0 +  E(t))3 +  L 2E(t)
—(—A1A2 +  (Ai — A2)773(0) (771(0 +  E(t))  (5.60)
+0.5(k +  1) (771 (0 +  E(t))3 — 1/2(771(0 +  £ (f) — 'fjiit))
= -(A i -  A2) (771(0 +  £ 7 ( 0 ) t73 ( 0  ~  £ 2̂ 1(0 
=  - £ 2 77i ( 0  +  (Ai -  A2)(771(0 +  £(0)773(0 
773(0 =  773(0 — 773(0
=  A3773(0  +  £(k )(t7 i(0  +  £ ( 0 ) 2 ~  A3773(0  -  £ (* 0(771 (0  +  £ ( 0 ) 2 (5-61)
=  A3t73(0
Obviously, by considering the inequality (2.20), the following equation is satisfied
l i m  | | t 7 3 ( O I I  = 0 .t—>oo (5.62)
r i TFurther defining 77(f) — 771(f) 772(f) , we can have:
_772(0J
—L i 1
7 7 ( f )  +
- L 2 0
=  577(O+0(f)773(O
%(f)
(Ai — A2) (771 (f) +  £ (0 )
(5.63)
where S  =  and 0(f)
—L2 0
0
is a bounded function.
Since 0(f) and 77
(Ai -  A2)(771(f) + £ (t)) 
bounded, then if L ^ 2 could be chosen in such a way that
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8  is a Hurwitz matrix, the synchronization error will converge to zero exponentially.
Once the synchronization between the transmitter and the receiver is achieved, 
the chaotic system in the receiver system can generate key signals the same as that 
used at the transmitter system, i.e., limt^oo k\(t) —> ki(t) and lim^oo k2 (t) -* k2(t). 
This means that lim^oo E(t)  =  y(t) -  k2(t) =  E(t)  +  k2(t) -  k2(t) -* E(t),  and then 
the decryption scheme (5.58) can be rewritten as:
m  = /(■■■ mm, mm mm  • • •, - * * « ) .  (5.64)'-----.-----' '------------------V----------------- '
n  n
Clearly, system (5.64) is the inverse procedure of the encryption scheme (5.55), which 
implies that the information signal can be finally retrieved.
■
5.2.2 Simulation Results
To explore the performance of the secure communication system proposed herein, 
two sets of numerical simulations have been performed for the different message sig­
nals.
Sim ulation I
In the first set of simulations, the message signal is considered as a sinusoidal
T
, im-5 8 0function p(t) = sin(0.057rt), and the gain vector L  is chosen as L 
plying that the matrix S  in (5.63) is Hurwitz. For the encryption and decryption 
purpose, h = 10 and n  =  30 are chosen for the n-shift cipher (5.55) and (5.58). First 
of all, we use the same “Key” for both of the transmitter and receiver system, namely, 
all the parameter settings of chaotic system in the transm itter and the receiver are 
the same.
Figure 5.9 shows the chaotic transmission signal transmitted over the public 
channel to the receiver system, and Figure 5.10 shows the synchronization error dy-
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Figure 5.9: The transmission signal
5
3 5 10 15 20 25 30
y -
D 5 10 15 20 25 30
\\
^ 1 --------------------------------1--------------------------- 1------------------------------ 1----------------------------- 1----------------------------- i------------------------------1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Time(sec)
Figure 5.10: Synchronization errors
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Time(sec)
Figure 5.11: The original information signal and the recovered signal
namics of the proposed communication system. Figure 5.11 shows the original plain 
signal p(t) and the retrieved signal p(t). Obviously, as the figure shows, after the 
synchronization phase, namely, once the synchronization of the transm itter and the 
receiver is achieved, the original message signal p(t) is recovered successfully.
The following figures show the effect of a mismatch in the “Key” for the proposed 
secure communication system. Figure 5.12 shows that even with a slightly different 
parameter settings, (for instance, Kd  = 0 and K r  = 0.001, where K d  and k t  are the 
parameter k  used in the transm itter and the receiver respectively, and other para­
meter settings are same), the synchronization error between the transm itter and the 
receiver is non-decayable. This means that the synchronization of the communication 
system, with the unmatched parameter, used in this simulation, can not be obtained. 
Therefore, the message signal can not be recovered at all, as shown in Figure 5.13.
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- 0.1 - 0.1
Figure 5.12: The behaviour of nondecaying errors of the “fake” synchronization
with K d  =  0 and K r  = 0.001.
Time(sec)
Figure 5.13: The original message signal and the wrongly recovered signal
with the unmatched Key
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Sim ulation  II
In the second set of simulations, we choose a piece of sound signal, that is “This is 
the automatic control laboratory at the Lakehead University.” , as the message signal 
to be transm itted through the proposed secure communication system. Similarly, we 
first use the same “Key” for the transm itter and the receiver. Figure 5.14 shows 
the simulation results; (a) represents the wave form of the original sound signal; 
(b) represents the wave form of the recovered sound signal and (c) represents the 
transmitted signal. Clearly, with the same “Key” used in the system, the original 
sound signal can be successfully retrieved at the receiver end. However, as Figure 5.15 
shows, with the wrong “Key” used at the receiver side, it was not possible to  achieve 
the synchronization, and therefore the original sound signal could not be recovered.
1
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-0 .5  
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15 16 17 18 19 20  21
1
0.5
¥  0 
-0.5
-1
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
10 
5
- 5  
-1 0
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Time(sec)
Figure 5.14: Simulation results for transmitting the sound signal with the 
same “Key” in transm itter and receiver systems
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Figure 5.15: Simulation results for transmitting the sound signal with the 
unmatched “Key” in transm itter and receiver systems
5.2.3 System  Security Analysis
For any secure communication scheme, a very important issue is whether or not 
it is actually secure. From the cryptographical viewpoint, according to (Schneier 
1996), the security of a cryptosystem is a function of two things: the strength of the 
algorithm and the length of the key. In the previous section, we already analyzed 
the security property of the chaos synchronization scheme in secure communication 
systems, from the control theory point of view. Since the proposed secure commu­
nication system uses the chaos synchronization scheme, which has both antiadaptive 
secure and antirobust secure properties, thereby it can prevent the system from being 
vulnerable to some potential attacks. This means that the algorithm used in the 
proposed secure communication system is safe enough. We now turn our attention to 
analyzing another security property of the proposed secure communication system, 
namely the length of the key.
It is quite clear from the description and numerical simulation above that the 
security of the proposed communication system is entirely dependent on the secrecy
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of the parameter settings of the chaotic system, which are set by the secret “Key” , 
i.e., K ey  =  {k , Ai, A2, A3}. Hence, some very practical questions to ask are: how 
accurately must the values of parameters in the “Key” be known for an intruder to 
recover the encrypted message signal? Is there enough Keys to prevent the system 
from being attacked by a brute-force attack? To answer these questions, we simu­
lated the proposed secure communication scheme by employing a wrong “Key” in 
the receiver system with random errors in the estimation of parameter settings. In 
these simulations, the message signal is still chosen as a sinusoidal function, i.e., 
p(t) =  sin(0.057r£), implying that the RMS norm value of the message signal is about 
0.5. Figure 5.16 shows the effect of the estimation error in system parameters on the 
recovery of the encrypted message signal. As Figure 5.16(a) shows, the estimation 
error of parameter k as little as 10-6 still produces a relatively large decryption error. 
Similarly, Figure 5.16(b-d) indicate that the estimation error of parameter Ai_3 as 
little as 10-5 still causes a relatively large decryption error. This means that, from 
the cryptographical view of point, the size of the key space of the proposed secure 
communication system will not be less than 106 x 105 x 105 x 105 =  1021 ~  269 
(Schneier 1996).
Assuming a brute-force search of every possible key is the most efficient method 
of breaking the secure communication system, then according to Table 5.1, which 
summarizes how long it would take to recover the encrypted message signal with the 
given key space, based on the fact that the key search machine tests 100 million keys 
per second, the length of the key for the proposed secure communication system is 
cryptographically large, implying that the proposed communication system is quite 
safe against a brute-force attack. Therefore, based on the analysis above, it is very 
clear that the proposed secure communication scheme can offer relatively high level 
of security for the transmission of message signals.
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Figure 5.16: The dependence of the recovered signal power on a fixed error in
parameters «, Ai_3, respectively
Key size 240 2 56 264 2 69
Required time 3.1 hours 347.5 days 5,849.4 years 317,100 years
Table 5.1: Brute-force key search times for various key sizes
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5.3 Secure Communication System  with the Time- 
Delay
In the former section, we proposed a new secure communication system, which 
has been proven to be able to offer a higher security level. Notice that, it only 
presents the ideal communication situation. However, for any real communication 
system, there always exists a propagation time-delay during the procedure of trans­
mitting message signals from the transm itter to the receiver and, from the control 
theory point of view, the time-delay may cause the communication system to be un­
stable (Kamen 1982). For instance, the work by (Chen and Liu 2000) showed that the 
existence of a time-delay in the synchronous system may result in the loss of synchro­
nization, thus, analyzing the stability of a  synchronized system with the time-delay 
is a quite important subject. Therefore, in the following section we shall take into 
account this practical problem to analyze the stability of the proposed secure com­
munication system in the presence of a time-delay.
Generally speaking, in a real communication system with the propagation time- 
delay involved, forcing the receiver system to synchronize with the transm itter system 
at exactly the same time seems unreasonable. Thus, in the following part, the syn­
chronization of the transmitter and the receiver for a communication system with an 
unknown constant time-delay is re-defined as follows:
D efin itio n  5.3.1 (J ian g  et al. 2004). The state of the receiver system at time t 
asymptotically synchronizes with the transmitter system at time t — rd, if
lim || x(t -  rd) -  x (t) ||=  0,
t —>oo
where rd is the unknown constant time-delay, and x(t) and x(t) are the state o f trans­
mitter and receiver system, respectively.
In light of this, the stability analysis for the proposed secure communication sys­
tem with the time-delay involved can be carried on as follows. We suppose th a t there
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is an unknown constant propagation time-delay2, rd, for the transmission of message 
signals from the transmitter to the receiver. This means that, at time t  — rd, the 
transmission signal is transmitted from the transmitter, and the delayed transmission 
signal will be received by the receiver at time t. Then the chaotic system (5.54) at 
the transmitter side can be re-expressed as follows:
0 1 0
v{t -  Td) = 0 0 0 v(t -  Td ) + LE(t -  rd)
0 0 •̂ 3
(Ai +  A2 )y( t  -  rd)
+  —AiA2y(t -  rd) -  (Ax -  A2)773y(t -  rd) -  0.5(« +  1 ) (y( t  -  r d))3
K ( K ) ( y ( t - T d ) ) 2  
y ( t - r d) =  r h ( t - T d) +  E ( t - T d)
(5.65)
where L  is the observer gain vector and E (t — rd) is the output of the encryption 
scheme. For the sake of brevity, here, we use a simple encryption scheme instead of 
function (5.55), which is given by:
E(t)  =  air^it) + a2p(t), (5.66)
where p(t)  is the message signal, and 0 < a ii2 < 1 are some constant which should be 
chosen in such a way to make the chaos to signal ratio as high as possible.
For the chaotic system at the receiver side, since there is an unknown but constant 
time-delay, rd, for the transmission procedure, it will be driven by the delayed signal 
y ( t - r d) for the synchronization purpose, so the system (5.57) can be re-expressed as
2Here, the assumption of a constant time-delay is based on the consideration that all the values 
of the transmission signal received by the receiver are unchanged but only delayed by a certain time.
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follows:
77(f) =
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 a3
r)(t) + L{y(t -  rd) -  y( t ))
+
(Ai +  A2 )y( t  -  rd) (5-67)
- ( A i A 2 +  (Ai -  \ 2 )f)3 ( t ))y{t  -  rd) -  0.5(/c +  1 ) {y( t  -  rd))3
K ( K ) ( y ( t - T d) ) 2 
y(t)  =  fix (t)
where y( t  — rd) is the received signal and L  is the gain vector the same as that used 
in the transm itter system.
If system (5.65) can synchronize with system (5.67), i.e., lim^oo || x( t  — Td ) — 
x(t) ||=  0, it can be obtained that 771(f) —> r)x(t — rd) and 173(f) —► r)2(t — rd). Then, 
the corresponding decryption scheme can be chosen as follows:
p(t) =  — (v(t ~  rd) -  y(t) -  aifjz(t)) (5.68)
where k\ 2 are same as that in the encryption scheme, and p(t) is the retrieved message 
signal, which is the same as the original message signal but delayed by rd.
We now prove that, by appropriately choosing the observer gain vector L, system
(5.67) can synchronize with (5.65), as described by the following theorem.
T h eo rem  5.3.1. Suppose a message signal, p(t), is transmitted through a secure com­
munication system consisting of a transmitter system with the chaotic system (5.65) 
and the encryption scheme (5.66), and a receiver system with the chaotic system
(5.67) and the decryption scheme (5.68). Further, consider that there is an unknown 
but constant propagation time-delay, rd, involved during the transmission procedure. 
By using the same “Key” in both the transmitter and the receiver system, the synchro­
nization of the transmitter and the receiver can be achieved, and the message signal, 
pit), can be completely recovered at the receiver side, but only delayed by time rd.
Proof. Defining the synchronization error 77(f) =  T}{t—Td)—rj(t), where 77 = Vi V2 Pi
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y i e l d s
%{t) =  Vi ( t -Td)  ~f k( t )
=  — Td) +  (Ai +  A2)(7 7 i(t — Td) + E(t  — Td)) +  L\ E( t  — Td)
-772(0 -  (Ai +  A2)(r?i(i -  rd) +  E(t  -  T d ) )
—Li(r)i(t -  Td )  +  E{t -  T d ) -  f}Xit))
=  -Lxirjxit -  Td) -  7)1 (0) +  m{t  -  Td) -  m(t)
= - L i f j i ( t )+ f j 2(t)
(5.69)
V2 ( 0  =  Tj2 ( i  -  T d )  -  7)2 ( 0
=  ( -A 1 A 2  -  (Ai -  \ 2) m ( t  -  T d ) ) ( v l { t  -  T d )  +  E ( t  -  T d ) )
-0 .5 («  +  l)(?7i(i -  T d )  +  E(t  -  T d ) ) 3 +  L2E{t -  T d )
— ( — A i A 2  +  ( A i  -  A 2 ) i 7 3 ( 0 ) ( 7 7 i ( t  -  T d )  +  £ ( f  -  T d ) )
+ 0 .5 ( k  +  l ) ( 7? i ( t  -  Td) +  S ( i  -  Td) ) 3 -  L 2{ r ) i ( t  -  T d )  +  E ( t  -  r d )  -  f j i ( t ) )  
=  - ( A i  -  A2) (771 ( t  -  Td) +  £ 7 ( i  -  T d ) ) r j 3( t )  -  L 2r j i ( t )
=  — L 2f j i ( t )  +  (Ai -  A2 ) ( t 7i ( t  -  Td) +  E ( t  -  T d ) ) f k ( t )
773(0 =  7)3 (i — Td) — 7)3(0
= A3773(i -  Td) +  K(K)(r)i(t -  Td ) + E(t -  Td ))2
—A3r?3(0 -  -  Td ) + E(t  -  Td))2
=  A3t)3(0
(5.71)
Obviously, by considering the inequality (2.20), the following equation is satisfied
lim \\v3(t)\\ = 0 . (5.72)
V ) OO
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Further defining 77 (t) =  
fj(t) =
Vi(t )  %  ( t) , we have:
Vi{t)
fh(t)1 —
- L \  1 
- L a  0  
577(f) +  <P{t)fj3(t)
rj(t) +
where S' =
- L x 1
and 0(f) =
- l 2 0
0





J A i  -  A2) (771 ( i  -  Td) +  S (£  -  Td)) 
function.
Since 0(f) and 77(f) are bounded, then if L i>2 could be chosen in such a way that 
S  is a Hurwitz matrix, the synchronization error will converge to zero exponentially. 
Thus, it can be obtained that 171(f) —»171 (£ — rd) and 173(f) —> 773 (f — Td) as £ tends to 
infinity. Then, the message signal, p(t), can be recovered as follows:
p(t) = i i y t i  -  Td) -  #(*) ~  “M * ) )
=  ~  rd ) + a i ??3^ -  Td) +  a 2p (f  -  T d ) - 7 7 1(f) -  a i 7 7 3(f))  (5.74)
-► P(t-rd)
5.3.1 Simulation Results
Similar to the former section, to demonstrate the performance of the secure com­
munication system with an unknown time-delay involved during the transmission 
procedure, two sets of numerical simulations have been performed for the different 
type of files.
S im ulation  I
In the first set of simulations, the message signal is still considered as a sinu-
lT
soidal function p(t) =  sin(0.057rf), and the gain vector L is chosen as L = 5 8 0
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implying that the matrix S  in (5.73) is Hurwitz. For the encryption and decryption 
purpose, a\ =  0.001 and a2 =  0.01 are chosen for function (5.66) and (5.68). Simi­







Figure 5.17: Synchronization errors of the secure communication system
with the time-delay.
Figure 5.17 shows the synchronization error dynamics of the proposed cryptosys­
tem with an unknown propagation time-delay. As the figure shows, even though 
there exists an unknown time-delay between the transmitter and the receiver for the 
proposed secure communication, the synchronization can still be achieved. Figure 
5.18 shows the original message signal p(t) and the retrieved signal p(t). Obviously, 
as the figure shows, once the synchronization of transmitter and receiver systems is 
achieved, the original message signal p(t) is recovered successfully but only delayed 
by rd.
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15
Time(sec)
Original message signal 
• Recovered message signal
Figure 5.18: The original message signal and the recovered signal
The following figures show the effect of a mismatch in the “Key” for the secure 
communication system with an unknown time-delay. Figure 5.19 shows that, similar 
to the pervious delay-free case, even with a slightly different parameter settings, 
(«d =  0 and kt =  0.001 and other parameters are same), the synchronization error 
between the transmitter and the receiver is non-decayable. This means that the 
synchronization of the communication system, with the unmatched parameter, used 
in this simulation, can not be obtained. Therefore, the message signal can not be 
recovered at all, as shown in Figure 5.20.
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Figure 5.19: The behaviour of nondecaying errors of the “fake” synchronization




Original message signal 
-— Recovered message signal
Time(sec)
Figure 5.20: The original message signal and the wrongly recovered signal 
with the unmatched key parameter
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Sim ulation  II
In the second set of simulations, still, the sound signal: “This is the automatic 
control laboratory at the Lakehead University.” , was chosen as the message signal 
to be transmitted through the secure communication system with an unknown time- 
delay. Similarly, we first use the same “Key” for the transmitter and the receiver. 
Figure 5.21 shows the simulation results; (a) represents the wave form of the original 
sound signal; (b) represents the wave form of the recovered sound signal and (c) rep­
resents the transmitted signal. Clearly, with the same “Key” used in the system, the 
original sound signal can be successfully retrieved at the receiver end, although there 
is an unknown time-delay in the proposed secure communication system. However, 
as Figure 5.22 shows, with the wrong “Key” used at the receiver side, it was not 
possible to achieve the synchronization, and therefore the original sound signal could 
not be recovered.
.1 I_________________I_________________I________1________I_________________I_________________I_________________I
15 16 17 18 19 20  21
■j  -------------------------- ,-------------------------- ,-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1-------------------------- j-
15 16 17 18 19 20  21
..... .A A
“A* _^  \ \........ ■\
.............S v  / "
15 16 17 18 19 20  21
Time(sec)
Figure 5.21: Simulation results for transmitting the sound signal with the 
same “Key” in transm itter and receiver systems
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Figure 5.22: Simulation results for transmitting the sound signal with the 
unmatched “Key” in transmitter and receiver systems
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The interest in chaos synchronization has been boosted mainly by its potential 
application in the design of new chaotic cryptosystems for secure communications. In 
fact, the history of chaotic secure communications is short and its future is uncertain 
due to its problematic security. Plenty of attempts were made only to find that it was 
not difficult for an intruder to be able to extract the message signal from the chaotic 
transmission signal. The concept of secure synchronization, having the properties of 
antiadaptive and antirobust secure, has been discussed in this thesis, since, from the 
viewpoint of systems theory, adaptive and robust control methods can provide very 
powerful tools for the intruder to break the security of the communication system. 
Then, based on this consideration, a secure synchronization scheme has been dis­
cussed, using the generalized Lorenz system family as the platform. Due to the fact 
that this scheme has detectable but unobservable states, it excludes the possibility of 
using some straightforward adaptive and/or robust attacks.
The application of this synchronization scheme to secure communication has 
been also discussed in this thesis. A new secure communication system, combining 
the secure synchronization scheme with a conventional cryptographic technique, has 
been proposed to provide a desired security level. It has been proven that, since 
the proposed system has the antiadaptive secure and antirobust secure properties, 
the system’s parameters, which are considered as the secret “Key” for this secure
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communication system, play a crucial role in the encryption and decryption of the 
private message signals being transmitted through the secure communication system. 
If an intruder tries to build a fake receiver to synchronize with the transm itter with 
a guessed “Key” , a large enough error in guessing the “Key” leads to a large error in 
reconstructing the signals of the same magnitude, and this error cannot be suppressed 
even by choosing very high control gains. Therefore, it is very difficult for an intruder 
to guess the “Key” , leading to the recovery of the transm itted message. Hence, a 
higher security level can be guaranteed.
Although the mathematical analysis and numerical simulation have shown that 
the proposed secure communication system can exclude a great deal of possible cryp­
tosystem breaking schemes, thereby providing us with a very promising way for trans­
mitting private messages safely, the system’s security still needs to be further analyzed 
from the cryptographical viewpoint. Hence, the future work concerning a comprehen­
sive and careful evaluation for the cryptographical properties of the proposed secure 
communication system may be carried out. Moreover, a further analysis of more 
sophisticated attacks, such as the known plaintext attack and ciphertext-only attack 
on the designed communication, is another aspect of the future work. Since attacks 
considered in this thesis mostly refer to the system control techniques, the capability 
of the designed communication system to withstand other more sophisticated attacks 
should be carried out to check the real security. This should provide us with a  cryp­
tographic view for the security of this designed cryptosystem.
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